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Summary 
 
This paper systematically presents theoretical and empirical research on 
board governance and earnings management of Chinese listed companies, 
trying to provide references for improving accounting information disclosure 
and corporate governance of listed companies. 
The whole paper includes six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction 
and introduces the background and contributions, the innovations and research 
framework of my study.  
The second chapter is the literature review on board governance and 
earnings management, in which I analyze and summarize existing literatures 
from different theoretical and empirical perspectives.  
The third chapter measures the extent of earnings management of Chinese 
listed companies by using the Modified-Jones Model, which is based on the 
reviewing of measurement of earnings management and different research 
models.  
The fourth chapter comprehensively evaluates board governance variables, 
namely, board size, board independence, board duality and board meetings by 
using descriptive statistics method.  
The fifth chapter proposes theoretical hypotheses and conducts empirical 
examination on the relationship between board governance and earnings 
management of Chinese listed companies. In this chapter panel date model is 
introduced and Hausman test is conducted to determine which effect—fixed 
effect or random effect can better explain the regression model.  
The sixth chapter is the conclusion and the main research findings are 
shown as follows: 
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1. Earnings management of Chinese listed companies 
    Among Chinese listed companies sorted by industries, 9 industries out of 
12 exaggerate the profits through upward earnings management, 3 industries 
hide the profits through downward earnings management. Social Services 
Industry shows the highest earnings management level, while Communication 
and Culture Industry show the lowest earnings management level.  
From 2002 to 2009, the average earnings management of Chinese listed 
companies gradually declined in fluctuation. The result indicates the quality of 
accounting information of Chinese listed companies has improved obviously in 
recent years. 
 
2. Board governance of Chinese listed companies 
The descriptive statistics of the four board governance variables show: the 
average number of board members in Chinese listed companies is 10; while the 
average number of independent directors is 4; only less than one tenth of 
Chinese listed companies have board chair also serves as CEO, and this 
situation tends to decrease. 
 
3. Empirical findings on board governance and earnings management 
By using Panel Data Model and controlling for corporate size, return on 
equity and other factors, the empirical findings on board governance and 
earnings management are: 
(1) Earnings management of Chinese listed companies is positively correlated 
to board size; 
(2) Earnings management of Chinese listed companies is negatively correlated 
with board independence; 
(3) Earnings management is negatively correlated to the separation of the roles 
of CEO and board chair. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Thesis background and contributions 
 
1.1.1 Thesis background 
 
Institutional setting of Chinese stock market  
The Chinese stock market was organized by the government as a vehicle for 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to raise capital and improve operating performance 
(Green, 2003). Since the primary objective of developing equity markets is to help 
SOEs relax external financing constraints, regulations introduced have been 
asymmetrically in favor of SOEs or the companies with close ties to the government. 
A fundamental dilemma of the above administrative approach stems from the state 
policy of maintaining a full or controlling ownership in firms1. The state wants the 
firms it owns to be run efficiently, but not solely for the purpose of wealth 
maximization, which creates conflicts of interest between the state as controlling 
shareholder and other shareholders. Even worse, the state is playing two roles at the 
same time—the controlling shareholder and the regulator (Clarke, 2003; Firth et al., 
2006). The state representatives dominate corporate boards, which greatly 
compromise the independence of corporate boardrooms (Liu, 2006). 
 
Tunneling in the Chinese listed companies 
The Chinese institutional set-up in the stock market results in pervasive 
tunneling activities among the listed firms. In most cases, local governments appoint 
the management of listed firms. As a result, the management often takes action to 
benefit the largest shareholders (the local government in most cases). It is noted that 
such practice may add social values in other ways that offset the social costs it 
imposes through tunneling—e.g., it may help reduce external financing constraints 
and transaction costs. However, outside investors almost always lose when the 
                                                        
1 The state takes direct control of important industries such as banking, energy and 
telecommunication 
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controlling shareholders tunnel (Cheung et al., 2005). Tunneling activities in China 
mainly take the form of granting loans to majority shareholders, and related-party 
transactions. A number of studies have examined the tunneling activities in the 
Chinese stock markets. Cheung et al. (2005) study a sample of related-party 
transactions between Chinese listed firms and their controlling shareholders. They 
provide evidence that related-party transactions are not typically beneficial for 
minority shareholders. Jiang et al. (2005) document the widespread use of corporate 
loans by controlling shareholders to extract funds from the listed firms in China. 
  
Earnings management in the Chinese listed companies 
Due to the administrative governance approach adopted in China, the regulators 
often rely on accounting numbers to govern the listed companies. the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires listed companies to meet certain return on 
equity (ROE) criteria before they can apply for permission to issue additional shares 
to existing shareholders. Therefore, listed firms have strong incentives to manage 
earnings above necessary thresholds.  
Earnings management tends to be pervasive in China also because private 
benefits of control are large but the level of corporate governance is poor and the 
protection of minority investors is weak. To enjoy these private control benefits, 
controlling shareholders have strong incentives to manage earnings to avoid de-listing, 
especially when de-listing decision is relied on certain accounting numbers. To 
controlling shareholders and other insiders, being de-listed implies the loss of private 
control benefits and future rent-seeking opportunities. Therefore, doing whatever it 
takes to avoid net loss for three consecutive years provides the Chinese listed 
companies with another incentive to manage earnings. 
 
 
1.1.2 Contributions 
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Enrich the research on board governance and earnings management of Chinese 
listed companies 
Based on current stage of China's capital market development, this paper 
attempts to do systematic empirical research on board structure of listed companies 
and earnings management. We expect our research outcome can provide effective 
evidence for understanding board monitoring mechanisms will impose constraint on 
earnings management and enrich the research on board governance and earnings 
management. 
 
Promote listed companies to improve board governance, effectively imposing 
constraint on earnings management, and improving transparency of listed 
companies’ accounting information 
We hope our research helps to understand the practical situation of board 
governance and earnings management of Chinese listed companies, in order to 
promote listed companies to improve board governance, effectively imposing 
constraint on earnings management, and improving transparency of accounting 
information of listed companies. 
 
1.2 Innovations 
Existing domestic empirical studies mainly focus on earnings management of 
listed companies in order to avoid regulatory constraints and market regulation. The 
studies aim to discover the motivation of earnings management of listed companies, 
and try to provide evidence for government regulation or provide references for the 
supervision of securities markets transactions. 
On board governance side, the majority of articles study the impact of board 
structure on performance of listed companies. Systematic empirical research on board 
governance and earnings management is not sufficient, especially lacking the analysis 
of constraints on earnings management from each aspect of board structure. We will 
conduct in-depth research in this paper. 
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1.3 Research framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Research framework of board governance and earnings management 
of Chinese listed companies 
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2. Literature Review on Board Governance and Earnings Management 
 
The prevalence of earnings management reduces the reliability of accounting 
information. Users may find it difficult to make fair assessment of corporate 
performance, managers’ ability and effort based on earnings information. Worse still, 
it may mislead investors to make wrong investment decisions.  
Board of Directors of listed companies exercises their monitoring functions to 
reduce earnings management in two ways: on one hand is to prevent managers from 
abusing their power against the interests of shareholders through earnings 
management; on the other hand is to prevent controlling shareholders from 
undermining corporate resources against the interests of minority shareholders for 
their own benefits. Therefore, board governance will impose effective constraints on 
earnings management. 
 
2.1 Earnings management 
 
A growing numbers of literatures abroad have examined corporate earnings 
management behavior in China's infant stock market. Aharony et al. (2000) identify 
evidence of earnings manipulation among the Chinese listed firms prior to their Initial 
Public Offers (IPOs). Chen and Yuan (2004) find that the Chinese listed firms manage 
earnings to satisfy the ROE requirements for rights issues. Jian and Wong (2005) 
present evidence that the listed manufacturing firms in China use related-party 
transactions to manage earnings. Chen et al. (2006) find that various aspects of 
corporate governance (e.g., boardroom characteristics and ownership) are associated 
with the incidence of corporate financial fraud. 
Domestic researches on earnings management mainly focus on earnings 
management of listed companies in order to avoid regulatory constraints and market 
regulation. Lu Jianqiao (1999) takes the sample of listed companies facing losses 
before the end of 1997 and finds that these companies generally adopted earnings 
management to reduce or increase earnings in the loss year and the year before and 
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after, in order to avoid three consecutive year loss which will be regulated by 
securities regulatory authorities. Zhang Zongyi and Huang Xinjian (2003) conduct 
empirical study on IPOs of Chinese listed companies from 1998 to 2000 and find that 
there is significant earnings management in the listing year and the year prior to and 
after listing. Zhang Yanling and Peng Haoran (2004) empirical study on motivations 
of earnings management and earnings forecast error find that listed companies with 
over-estimated earnings will increase earnings through managing the operating 
income and working capital in the first year after listing, indicating there is strong 
motivation for listed companies to manipulate earnings in order to avoid punishment 
on earnings forecast error. Wang Yaping et al (2005) present evidence that from 1995 
to 2003, there were earnings management by Chinese listed companies in order to 
avoid reporting loss. 
 
2.2 Board governance 
 
2.2.1 Board size and earnings management 
The Board of directors has direct monitoring responsibility on the management, 
and obligations to impose constraints on earnings management. Board size (number of 
board members) is an important factor to the efficiency of board governance. A large 
number of empirical studies have provide evidence that there is relation between 
board size and corporate performance, but current studies do not give consistent 
research findings on the relationship between board size and corporate performance. 
However, empirical researches on board size and earnings management are rare.  
Some scholars believe that to a certain corporate size, a too large board of 
directors cannot function to the best. This view is based primarily on the Agency 
Theory and Organizational Behavior Theory. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) present 
although board monitoring capacity increases with the number of directors increasing, 
the larger the board of directors, the severer is the free-rider problem (agency 
problem). The loss from coordination and organization will surpass the profit brought 
from increasing numbers of directors. Jensen (1993) indicates that the larger the board 
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of directors, the lower is the efficiency. The “hatred and revenge” between directors 
may weaken the board's monitoring and evaluation on CEO. While the board will be 
more easily controlled and influenced by CEO. Yermack (1996) identifies evidence 
from an empirical test. He takes "Fortune 500” companies as a sample and finds that a 
small board of directors is more efficient than a large one. Eisenberg et al (1998) take 
the sample of small and medium companies in Finland, and prove that there is a 
significant correlation between a smaller board of directors and higher firm 
performance. Wu (2000) studies changes in board size from 1991 to 1995. She finds 
that the overall size of board shows a reducing trend during this time, and the pressure 
from active investors can partially explain the phenomenon. She identifies that the 
market participants believe that small board of directors is doing better than relatively 
large board of directors in monitoring managers. 
Resource Dependence Theory is the main theoretical foundation for the 
view that relatively large board of directors is more conducive to improve 
governance efficiency. More directors may bring more knowledge, experience and 
external resources to the board, making knowledge and experience within the board 
play complementary roles better, which to some extent reduces the company risk. In 
addition, it is easier to coordinate interests of different stakeholders in the board with 
different stakeholder representatives. Dalton et al (1999) present evidence based on 
the analysis of 131 different samples that there is significant positive correlation 
between corporate performance and board size, and the larger board of directors is 
able to provide better external resources and is more professional. Coles et al (2005) 
show that small board size does not apply to all kinds of companies, for those 
cross-industries, large-scale and high-debt companies, who need help and experience 
from more directors, board size and company performance are positively correlated. 
From domestic perspective, Wang Liyan and Liu Junxia (2003) find that 
earnings management is negatively correlated with board size. Cai Ning (2003) finds 
that there is a significant positive correlation between board size and financial fraud. 
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2.2.2 Board independence and earnings management 
From an agency perspective, the ability of the board to act as an effective 
monitoring mechanism is dependent upon its independence from management. 
A large number of literatures abroad have conducted empirical research on 
independent directors’ monitoring function on earnings management. Beasley (1996) 
finds that the presence of independent directors on the board reduces the likelihood of 
financial statement fraud. Klein A. (2002) suggests that boards structured to be more 
independent from CEO are more effective in monitoring the corporate financial 
accounting process and earnings management. Xie et al. (2003) finds that earnings 
management is less likely to occur in companies whose boards include both more 
independent outside directors and directors with corporate experience. But the level of 
earnings management may influence the subsequent selection of board. Davidson et 
al.(2005) find that, based on a broad cross-sectional sample of 434 listed Australian 
firms, a majority of non-executive directors on the board are significantly associated 
with a lower likelihood of earnings management. Peasnell et al. (2005) examines 
whether the incidence of earnings management by UK firms depends on board 
monitoring. Results indicate that the likelihood of managers making 
income-increasing abnormal accruals is negatively related to the proportion of 
outsiders on the board. Cornett (2009) finds that earnings management and corporate 
governance are endogenously determined. Thus, OLS estimation can lead to biased 
coefficients and a simultaneous equations approach is used. Based on 593 largest 
bank holding companies head-quartered in US, the paper indicates earnings, board 
independence, and capital are negatively related to earnings management.  
From the domestic point of view, Zhang and Chen (2006) shows that the higher 
percentage of independent directors in the board, the lower level of earnings 
management, which suggests independent directors of Chinese listed companies are 
playing an important role. Zhang et al. (2006) indicates there is a significant "U" 
shaped relationship between the proportion of independent directors and earnings 
management.  
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However, Cai (2007) indicates that there is no significant correlation between 
independent directors and earnings management. Wang (2007) tests the relation 
between independent directors and earnings quality based on the listed companies’ 
data from 2002-2004. The result is, in general, independent directors have not 
performed an efficient role yet in China. 
 
2.2.3 Board duality and earnings management 
Board duality, that is, whether the chairman of the board is the same person as 
general manager, is the focus of academic debate. Modern Stewardship Theory 
argues that chairman of the board and general manager should be the same 
person. Boyd (1995) points out that this mode helps to improve the efficiency of 
communication and decision-making. 
However, Agency Theory actively advocates chairman of the board and 
general manager should be different persons. In order to prevent moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems generated by managers, an effective monitoring 
mechanism is necessary. If the manager is the same person as the chairman, then the 
monitoring mechanism will collapse. Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993) 
suggest that chairman and general manager is the same person will lead to a low 
efficient board, because the board would be difficult to carry out its monitoring 
function. Dechow et al (1996) find that if the board is controlled by general manager, 
earnings management is more likely to occur. Beasley (1996) points out, CEO serves 
as chairman of the board will lead to power concentration and conflict of interests, 
thus undermine board monitoring function. 
From domestic view, CEO serves as chairman of the board is often seen as 
hindering corporate performance improvement. However, it has not yet reached a 
clear conclusion that chairman and general manager is the same person will increase 
the possibility of earnings management. This paper will conduct empirical research in 
this area in order to clarify the relation between board duality and earnings 
management. 
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2.2.4 Board meetings and earnings management 
The frequency of board meetings may reflect whether the board is active or not. 
It is generally believed that an active board is more effective in monitoring the 
management, so decisions made are more in line with the interests of majority 
shareholders, thus is conducive to enhance corporate performance.  
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that increasing board meeting time will 
improve the efficiency of the board. The more frequent board meeting is, directors are 
more willing to perform their duties which are consistent with the interests of 
shareholders. On the contrary, Jensen (1993) finds that most of the board meetings are 
not very effective. The board is often forced to engage in high-frequency activities to 
resolve corporate matters. Therefore, a higher frequency of board activities may be 
the response to poor corporate performance. 
The literature on board meetings and earnings management are rare and mainly 
from abroad. Vafeas (1999) finds that the more frequent the board meeting, the lower 
degree of earnings management and the more transparency is corporate financial 
information. Xie et al (2003) suggest that board meeting is an important factor to 
restrict earnings management activities of managers. 
 
 
2.3 Literature review summary 
 
From the above literature review, we find there are few papers making profound 
theoretical and empirical analysis on the relationship between board governance of 
Chinese listed companies and earnings management. And the relevant empirical 
studies show quite different results. So in the following parts, we will first give 
theoretical and empirical analysis of earnings management in Chinese listed 
companies, then followed by examination on the relations between board governance 
of Chinese listed companies and earnings management.  
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3. Theoretical and Empirical Analysis on Earnings Management 
   
The setting up of corporate board is to coordinate the conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and managers, aimed at maximizing the shareholders' interests 
by dispensing constraints and incentives to managers. Therefore, a perfect governance 
structure of the board will compress manager’s implementation space of earnings 
management and manipulation. 
In this part, we will first study the quantitative analysis of earnings management 
through reviewing and summarizing the existing quantitative research models, and 
then by comparing the models, we will determine a suitable model for earnings 
management measurement of Chinese listed companies. 
 
3.1 Measurement of earnings management 
Theorists have been attempting to deliver an accurate and objective measurement 
for earnings management in order to do a better quantitative research. The existing 
measuring models of earnings management can be divided into three categories: 
accruals model, specific accruals model and accruals distribution model.  
3.1.1 Accruals model 
Accrual model is currently the mainstream measuring of earnings management. 
This method points out that total accruals of a listed company is composed of accruals 
by earnings management, namely discretionary accruals, and accruals by different 
accounting methods, namely non-discretionary accruals. Therefore, from measuring 
non-discretionary accruals by constructing a regression model, discretionary accruals 
is calculated as the difference between total accruals and non- discretionary accruals, 
which measures the degree of earnings management. 
3.1.2 Specific accruals model 
As accrual method depends on some subjective assumptions, there is some 
limitation in practical application. Researchers choose to study accruals models case 
12 
 
by case and put forward the specific accruals model. They try to make analysis and 
calculation of specific accrued items to determine the degree of earnings management. 
But the drawbacks of specific accruals model often confines to a small sample or 
specific industry, which makes the research results impossible to popularize. 
3.1.3 Accruals distribution model 
Accruals distribution model is a more practical method. This method firstly need 
to determine specific earnings index, then through testing distribution of reporting 
earnings around the specific index to judge the existence of earnings management. 
Existing researches find that around specific earnings index, there are more or less 
observations than expected, indicating around these specific earnings index earnings 
management exists. But the shortcoming is that by using this method, one cannot get 
the information on means and degrees of earnings management hence cannot further 
do a quantitative study.  
3.1.4 Measurement of earnings management 
According to existing empirical researches home and abroad, we find that 
accruals models get the most extensive applications in quantitative study of earnings 
management, and the theoretical research on earnings management through accruals 
model is relatively mature. 
In this paper, we will conduct empirical test on the relationship between board 
structure and earnings management, so quantitative measurement of earnings 
management is necessary. In addition, the realized quantitative measurement should 
support large sample. In this respect, accruals model has the advantage over the other 
two models, therefore we will adopt accruals model for measuring earnings 
management.  
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3.2 Earnings management models under accruals method 
Healy (1985) suggests that the net income of firms can be divided into two parts: 
operating cash flow and accruals, and notices that accrued items can change the 
confirming time for reported earnings and allow managers to transfer earnings 
between each period. The measurement of earnings management under accruals 
model is based on decomposition of total accruals (TAC) into non-discretionary 
accruals and discretionary accruals. Non-discretionary accrual is calculated through 
regression model and discretionary accrual is the difference between total accruals 
and non-discretionary accruals, which is a measure of earnings management. By 
reviewing existing research on earnings management models, representative 
econometric models basically are as follows:  
3.2.1 Jones Model 
Jones (1991) relaxes the assumption that non-discretionary accruals can only be 
constant numbers and puts forward an earnings management model aimed at 
controlling the influence of economic environment change on non-discretionary 
accruals. The model calculating non-discretionary accruals is demonstrated below: 
t 1 t-1 2 t t-1 3 t t-1NDA =a (1/A ) + a REV /A + a PPE /AΔ  
Where: 
△REVt = change in sales revenue between year t -1 and t, 
PPEt = gross property, plant and equipment in year t, 
At - 1= total assets at the end of the previous year t-1, 
a1, a2 and a3 are industry-specific coefficients estimated from the following 
cross-sectional regression: 
t 1 t-1 2 t t-1 3 t t-1TA = (1/A ) + REV /A + PPE /A tVα α αΔ +  
Where 1α , 2α and 3α  are the OLS regression estimates of a1, a2 and a3 
respectively, TAt = total accruals in year t divided by total assets in year t-1. 
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A hidden hypothesis of Jones model is that sales revenue cannot be manipulated. 
But if earnings management is realized through manipulation of sales revenue, then 
the model will make the part of earnings management removed from discretionary 
accruals. 
3.2.2 Industry Model 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) present industry model which also eases the 
assumption that non-discretionary accruals are constants as Jones model does. But the 
difference is that industry model assumes that influence factors of non-discretionary 
accruals are the same between different enterprises in the same industry. Industry 
model is as follows:  
NDA= r1+r2 median (TA) 
Where median (TA) is the median of total accruals divided by total assets in year 
t-1, r1 and r2 are industry-specific coefficients estimated from OLS model. 
Industry model eliminates the difference of non-discretionary accruals within 
different enterprises in the same industry, but if the changes of non-discretionary 
accruals are rendered by enterprise specific environment factors, the industry model 
cannot separate non-discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals accurately.  
3.2.3 Modified-Jones Model 
Assume account sale also can become a source of earnings management. 
Dechow (1995) presents Modified-Jones Model by deducting accounts receivable 
from sales revenue. The model is as follows: 
t 1 t-1 2 t t t-1 3 t t-1NDA =a (1/A ) + a ( REV - REC )/A + a PPE /AΔ Δ  
Where, △RECt = change in accounts receivable between year t -1 and t, 
industry-specific coefficients a1, a2 and a3 and non-discretionary accruals come from 
the original Jones Model. 
So the only adjustment of Modified-Jones Model is that it deducts change in 
accounts receivable from change in sales revenue. The underlying assumption is that 
all the change in accounts receivable is caused by earnings management. This is based 
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on the following reasoning, for managers, it is much easier to manage earnings from 
accounts receivable than from cash sale income. 
 
3.3 Earnings management of Chinese listed companies 
3.3.1 Modified-Jones Model for earnings management 
From Chinese listed companies operating situations and accounting procedures, 
corporate non-discretionary accruals will definitely change with the economic 
environment. Although the original Jones Model is trying to explain the influence of 
economic environment change on non-discretionary accruals, it does not take into 
account that different industries have different influence factors on non-discretionary 
accruals of the listed companies. And if most of non-discretionary accruals changes 
are caused by enterprise specific environment factors, then the industry model, which 
ignores differences in enterprises within the same industry, cannot separate 
non-discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals accurately. To sum up, we will 
adopt the Modified-Jones Model to measure earnings management in Chinese listed 
companies. 
[ ]t t t-1 1 t-1 2 t t t-1 3 t t-1EDA = TA /A - a (1/A ) + a ( REV - REC )/A + a PPE /A  Δ Δ  
Where: 
△REVt = change in sales revenue between year t -1 and t, 
△RECt = change in accounts receivable between year t -1 and t, 
PPEt = gross property, plant and equipment in year t, 
At - 1= total assets at the end of the previous year t-1, 
a1, a2 and a3 are industry-specific coefficients estimated from the following 
cross-sectional regression: 
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t 1 t-1 2 t t t-1 3 t t-1 tTA = (1/A ) + ( REV - REC )/A + PPE /A + vα α αΔ Δ  
Where 1α , 2α and 3α  are the OLS regression estimates of a1, a2 and a3  
TAt = NetIncomet - CFOt,  
Where CFOt = Net Cash flow from operating activities in year t. 
 
3.3.2 Sample selection 
Due to measurement of earnings management need to differentiate research 
samples of various industries, we differentiate various industries according to Industry 
Classification of Listed Companies Guidelines issued by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission.  
Our empirical test are conducted using data for all the listed firms in Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (A Share) with fiscal year ends between 2001 and 2009 as a primary 
sample, making the following screening:  
1) Eliminating listed companies in financial and insurance industry, because 
compared with other sectors, companies in financial and insurance sector have special 
accounting rules;  
2) Removing all ST companies;  
3) Removing companies with incomplete financial data between 2001 and 2009.  
 
In order to make a comprehensive research on earnings management of Shanghai 
A-share listed companies, same number of listed companies are selected as samples 
from each industry, and altogether 93 listed companies are finally chosen, covering 12 
industries (see table 1 below): 
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Table 1: 2001-2009 Shanghai Stock Exchange 93 A-share sample companies 
sorted by industry 
 
No. 
Securities 
Code 
Corporate Name  Industry No.
Securities 
Code 
Corporate Name Industry 
1 600508.SH 
SHANGHAI DATUN 
ENERGY 
RESOURSES 
CO.,LTD. 
 
MINING AND 
QUARRYING 
INDUSTRIES 
48 600438.SH TONGWEI CO.,LTD 
 
FARMING, 
FORESTRY, 
ANIMAL 
HUSBANDRY 
AND FISHERY 
INDUSTRIES 
2 600028.SH 
CHINA 
PETROLEUM & 
CHEMICAL 
CORPORATION 
49 600075.SH
XINJIANG TIANYE 
CO.,LTD. 
3 600188.SH 
YANZHOU COAL 
MINING CO., LTD. 
50 600975.SH
HUNAN NEW 
WELLFUL CO.LTD. 
4 600489.SH 
ZHONGJIN GOLD 
CO., LTD. 
51 600108.SH
GANSU YASHENG 
INDUSTRIAL
（GROUP）CO.,LTD 
5 600395.SH 
GUIZHOU 
PANJIANG 
REFINED COAL 
CO.,LTD. 
52 600093.SH
SICHUAN HEJIA 
CO.LTD. 
6 600583.SH 
OFFSHORE & OIL 
ENGENEERING 
CO.,LTD 
53 600097.SH
SHANGHAI 
KAICHUANG 
MARINE 
INTERNATIONAL 
CO.,LTD 
7 600547.SH 
SHANDONG GOLD 
MINING CO.,LTD. 
54 600631.SH
SHANGHAI 
BAILIAN GROUP 
CO.,LTD. 
WHOLESALE 
AND RETAIL 
TRADE 
INDUSTRIES 
8 600123.SH 
SHANXI LANHUA 
SCI-TECH 
VENTURE CO.,LTD 
55 600826.SH
SHANGHAI 
LANSHENG 
CORPORATION 
9 600037.SH 
BEIJING GEHUA 
CATV NETWORK 
CO., LTD. COMMUNICAION 
AND CULTURE 
INDUSTRIES 
56 600859.SH
BEIJING 
WANGFUJING 
DEPARTMENT 
STORE 
(GROUP)CO.,LTD. 
10 600088.SH 
CHINA TELEVISION 
MEDIA LTD. 
57 600755.SH
XIAMEN 
INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE GROUP CO., 
LTD. 
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11 600551.SH 
TIME PUBLISHING 
& MEDIA CO., LTD. 
58 600628.SH
SHANGHAI NEW 
WORLD CO.,LTD. 
12 600831.SH 
BROADCAST & TV 
NETWORK 
INTERMEDIARY 
（GROUP）CO.LTD 
59 600827.SH
SHANGHAI 
FRIENDSHIP 
GROUP 
INCORPORATED 
COMPANY 
13 600880.SH 
CHENGDU B-RAY 
MEDIA CO., LTD. 
60 600056.SH
CNTIC TRADING 
CO., LTD. 
14 600236.SH 
GUANGXI 
GUIGUAN 
ELECTRIC POWER 
CO.,LTD. 
 
POWER, GAS AND 
WATER 
PRODUCTION AND 
SUPPLY 
INDUSTRIES 
61 600500.SH
SINOCHEM 
INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATION 
15 600795.SH 
GD POWER 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO., LTD 
62 600874.SH
TIANJIN CAPITAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
GROUP 
PROTECTION CO., 
LTD 
 
SOCIAL SERVICE 
INDUSTRY 
16 600027.SH 
HUADIAN POWER 
INTERNATIONAL 
CO.,LTD. 
63 600611.SH
DAZHONG 
TRANSPORTATION
（GROUP）CO.,LTD. 
17 600116.SH 
CHONGQING 
THREE GORGES 
WATER 
CONSERVANCY 
AND ELECTRIC 
POWER CO.,LTD. 
64 600054.SH
HUANGSHAN 
TOURISM 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO., ,LTD. 
18 600021.SH 
SHANGHAI 
ELECTRIC POWER 
CO.,LTD. 
65 600754.SH
SHANGHAI 
JINJIANG 
INTERNATIONAL 
HOTELS 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO., LTD. 
19 600642.SH 
SHENERGY 
CO.,LTD 
66 600358.SH
CHINA UNITED 
TRAVEL CO., LTD. 
20 600780.SH 
TOP ENERGY 
CO.,LTD 
67 600662.SH
SHANGHAI 
QIANGSHENG 
HOLDING CO.,LTD. 
21 600292.SH 
CHONGQING 
JIULONG ELECTRIC 
POWER CO.,LTD 
68 600008.SH
BEIJING CAPITAL 
CO., LTD 
22 600185.SH 
XI’AN  GREE 
REAL ESTATE 
 
 
69 600350.SH
SHANDONG 
EXPRESSWAY 
19 
 
CO.,LTD  
 
 
 
 
REAL ESTATE 
INDUSTRY 
CO.,LTD. 
23 600748.SH 
SHANGHAI 
INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO.,LTD. 
70 600345.SH
WUHAN YANGTZE 
COMMUNICATION 
INDUSTRY GROUP 
CO., LTD 
 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRY 
24 600383.SH 
GEMDALE 
CORPORATION 
71 600601.SH
FOUNDER 
TECHNOLOGY 
GROUP CORP. 
25 600823.SH 
SHANGHAI 
SHIMAO CO.,LTD 
72 600654.SH
SHANGHAI FEILO 
CO.,LTD. 
26 600648.SH 
SHANGHAI WAI 
GAOQIAO FREE 
TRADE ZONE 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO.,LTD. 
73 600122.SH
JIANGSU HONGTU 
HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY 
CO.,LTD 
27 600246.SH 
BEIJING 
VANTONE  REAL 
ESTATE CO.,LTD 
74 600850.SH
SHANGHAI 
EAST-CHINA 
COMPUTER 
CO.,LTD 
28 600376.SH 
BEIJING CAPITAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO.,LTD. 
75 600680.SH
SHANGHAI 
POTEVIO CO.,LTD. 
29 600724.SH 
NINGBO FUDA 
CO.,LTD. 
76 600734.SH
FUJIAN START 
GROUP CO. LTD. 
30 600266.SH 
BEIJING URBAN 
CONSTRUCTION 
INVESTMENT& 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO.,LTD. 
BUILDING 
INDUSTRY 
77 600050.SH
CHINA UNITED 
NETWORK 
COMMUNICATION
S  LIMITED 
31 600068.SH 
CHINA GEZHOUBA 
GROUP CO.,LTD. 
78 600196.SH
SHANGHAI FOSUN 
PHARMACEUTICAL 
(GROUP) CO.,LTD. 
MANUFACTURIN
G INDUSTRIES 
32 600477.SH 
ZHEJIANG 
HANGXIAO STEEL 
STRUCTURE 
CO.,LTD 
79 600597.SH
BRIGHT DAIRY & 
FOOD CO., LTD 
33 600853.SH 
LONGJIAN ROAD & 
BRIDGE CO.,LTD. 
80 600612.SH
LAO FENG XIANG 
CO.,LTD. 
34 600170.SH 
SHANGHAI 
CONSTRUCTION 
GROUP CO., LTD 
81 600186.SH
HENAN LIANHUA 
GOURMET 
POWDER CO., LTD. 
35 600039.SH 
SICHUAN ROAD & 
BRIDGE CO.,LTD 
82 600690.SH
QINGDAO HAIER 
CO., LTD 
20 
 
36 600820.SH 
SHANGHAI 
TUNNEL 
ENGINEERING CO., 
LTD. 
83 600031.SH
SANY HEAVY 
INDUSTRY CO.,LTD 
37 600512.SH 
TENGDA 
CONSTRUCTION 
GROUP CO., LTD. 
84 600884.SH
NINGBO 
SHANSHAN 
CO.,LTD. 
38 600004.SH 
GUANGZHOU 
BAIYUN 
INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORT CO.,LTD. 
 
TRANSPORTATION 
AND STORAGE 
INDUSTRIES 
85 600150.SH
CHINA CSSC 
HOLDINGS 
LIMITED 
39 600115.SH 
CHINA EASTERN 
AIRLINES CO.,LTD. 
86 600832.SH
SHANGHAI 
ORIENTAL 
PEARL(GROUP) 
CO., LTD 
INTEGRATED 
INDUSTRY 
40 600650.SH 
SHANGHAI JIN 
JIANG 
INTERNATIONAL 
INDUSTRIAL 
INVESTMENT 
CO.,LTD 
87 600624.SH
SHANGHAI 
FUDAN  FORWAR
D S&T CO., LTD 
41 600377.SH 
JIANGSU 
EXPRESSWAY 
CO.,LTD 
88 600622.SH
SHANGHAI JIABAO 
INDUSTRY & 
COMMERCE 
(GROUP) CO.,LTD 
42 600717.SH 
TIANJIN 
PORT(GROUP) CO., 
LTD. 
89 600051.SH
NINGBO UNITED 
GROUP CO.,LTD. 
43 600125.SH 
CHINA RAILWAY 
TIELONG 
CONTAINER 
LOGISTICS CO., 
LTD. 
90 600790.SH
CHINA 
LIGHT&TEXTILE 
INDUSTRIAL CITY 
GROUP CO.,LTD. 
44 600897.SH 
XIAMEN 
INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORT CO.,LTD. 
91 600846.SH
SHANGHAI TONGJI 
SCIENCE & 
TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRIAL 
CO.,LTD. 
45 600428.SH 
COSCO SHIPPING 
CO.,LTD. 
92 600895.SH
SHANGHAI 
ZHANGJIANG 
HI-TECH PARK 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO.,LTD. 
21 
 
46 600598.SH 
HEILONGJIANG 
AGRICULTURE 
CO.,LTD. 
FARMING, 
FORESTRY, 
ANIMAL 
HUSBANDRY AND 
FISHERY 
INDUSTRIES 
93 600770.SH
JIANGSU ZONGYI 
CO., LTD 
47 600257.SH 
DAHU 
AGRICULTURE 
CO.,LTD. 
   
Data source：Wind database (Shanghai A-share Companies financial statement data) 
 
3.3.3 Empirical test and results on earnings management 
We adopt SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Models) to conduct empirical 
test on the following model: 
t 1 t-1 2 t t t-1 3 t t-1 tTA = (1/A ) + ( REV - REC )/A + PPE /A + vα α αΔ Δ          (1) 
Regression results for parameter 1α , 2α and 3α  can be found in Appendix, 
where: 
ta_assi = t t-1TA /A  
drvci = t t t-1( REV - REC )/AΔ Δ  
ppei = t t-1PPE /A   (i = 1.2....., 93) 
The results show that the model is significant, hence indicates modified-Jones 
model can estimate sample enterprises’ non-discretionary accruals. 
 
According to the following equation: 
[ ]t t t-1 1 t-1 2 t t t-1 3 t t-1EDA = TA /A - a (1/A ) + a ( REV - REC )/A + a PPE /A    Δ Δ  (2) 
The expected discretionary accruals are residuals from the above regression (1), 
thus we can come to the conclusion that measurement results of discretionary accruals 
(EDA) of the above 93 companies are shown in Table 2.1-2.12. 
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Earnings Management of Companies in Mining and Quarrying Industries 
From the table below, we can see from 2002 to 2009 there are 33 observations in 
Mining and Quarrying Industries with negative earnings management (EDA), 
meaning the enterprises made downward earnings management to hide profits by 
manipulating discretionary accruals, and the maximum extent is -0.11; while another 
31 observations showing positive EDA, indicating sample enterprises made 
income-increasing earnings management by increasing discretionary accruals, and the 
maximum extent is 0.10. 
During observation period the average earnings management of sample 
companies is 2.36E-07, showing that the whole industry executed an upward earnings 
management.  
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Table 2.1: Earnings Management Measurement in Mining and Quarrying Industries 
2002-2009 
 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
SHANGHAI 
DATUN 
ENERGY 
RESOURSES 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.02191 
ZHONGJIN 
GOLD CO., 
LTD. 
2002 0.079378
SHANDONG 
GOLD 
MINING 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.0182915
2003 -0.02845 2003 -0.01833 2003 -0.020303
2004 0.046807 2004 -0.03762 2004 0.0336098
2005 0.029892 2005 -0.02262 2005 0.0471396
2006 -0.04498 2006 0.029524 2006 0.046281
2007 -0.03905 2007 0.050364 2007 -0.00124
2008 0.017668 2008 0.023211 2008 -0.01591
2009 -0.0038 2009 -0.10391 2009 -0.10786
CHINA 
PETROLEUM & 
CHEMICAL 
CORPORATION  
2002 0.00811 
GUIZHOU 
PANJIANG 
REFINED 
COAL 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.004291
SHANXI 
LANHUA 
SCI-TECH 
VENTURE 
CO.,LTD  
2002 -0.02103
2003 0.005634 2003 -0.05737 2003 -0.01906
2004 -0.02783 2004 0.102788 2004 0.042948
2005 0.024024 2005 0.006564 2005 0.039261
2006 -0.01163 2006 -0.07259 2006 -0.00996
2007 -0.01719 2007 -0.01438 2007 0.014924
2008 0.011001 2008 0.036673 2008 -0.11288
2009 0.007883 2009 -0.00597 2009 0.065803
YANZHOU 
COAL MINING 
CO., LTD. 
2002 0.051708 
OFFSHORE 
& OIL 
ENGENEERI
NG CO.,LTD
2002 -0.02026
2003 -0.0411 2003 -0.00931
2004 -0.02201 2004 0.010114
2005 0.050657 2005 -0.02599
2006 -0.05647 2006 -0.01184
2007 -0.05162 2007 0.025623
2008 -0.0323 2008 -0.00601
2009 0.10114 2009 0.037672
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Earnings Management of Companies in Communication and Culture Industries 
From the table below, we can see from 2002 to 2009 there are 16 observations in 
Communication and Culture Industries with negative EDA, meaning the enterprises 
made downward earnings management, and the maximum extent is -0.10; while 
another 24 observations showing positive EDA, indicating enterprises made 
income-increasing earnings management and the maximum extent is 0.07.  
The enterprise which made the maximum upward and downward manipulation 
in earnings is CHINA TELEVISION MEDIA LTD.  
During observation period the average earnings management of sample 
companies is 2E-07, showing that the whole industry executed an upward earnings 
management.  
Table 2.2：Earnings Management Measurement in Communication and Culture 
Industries 2002-2009 
 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
BEIJING 
GEHUA CATV 
NETWORK 
CO., LTD. 
2002 0.033385 
TIME 
PUBLISHING & 
MEDIA CO., LTD. 
2002 -0.02139
CHENGDU 
B-RAY 
MEDIA 
CO., LTD. 
2002 0.013243
2003 -0.0421 2003 -0.02705 2003 0.017483
2004 0.040786 2004 -0.01837 2004 -0.00149
2005 0.042888 2005 0.006197 2005 -0.0013
2006 -0.0651 2006 0.004162 2006 0.033447
2007 0.01058 2007 0.046368 2007 -0.09463
2008 0.016384 2008 0.010501 2008 0.003891
2009 -0.03681 2009 -0.00042 2009 0.029357
CHINA 
TELEVISION 
MEDIA LTD. 
2002 0.01635 
BROADCAST & 
TV NETWORK 
INTERMEDIARY 
（GROUP）CO.LTD
2002 0.008453    
2003 -0.01738 2003 0.030361    
2004 0.008633 2004 0.02398    
2005 0.007832 2005 -0.03908    
2006 -0.02128 2006 -0.0412    
2007 0.037611 2007 0.017437    
2008 -0.1029 2008 0.003757    
2009 0.071132 2009 -0.00371    
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Earnings Management of Companies in Power, Gas and Water Production and 
Supply Industries 
From the table below, we can see from 2002 to 2009 there are 33 observations in 
Power, Gas and Water Production and Supply Industries with negative EDA, 
suggesting the enterprises made downward earnings management, and the maximum 
extent is -0.34; while 31 observations showing positive EDA, indicating enterprises 
made income-increasing earnings management, and the maximum extent is 0.40.  
Both the upward and downward earnings management is greater than Mining 
and Quarrying Industries and Communication and Culture Industries. The annual 
earnings management of SHANGHAI ELECTRIC POWER CO., LTD. is the highest in 
the industry.  
During observation period the average earnings management of sample 
companies is 6.25E-09, suggesting that the whole industry executed an upward 
earnings management.  
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Table 2.3：Earnings Management Measurement in Power, Gas and Water Production 
and Supply Industries 2002-2009 
 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
GUANGXI 
GUIGUAN 
ELECTRIC 
POWER CO.,LTD. 
2002 -0.01795 
CHONGQING 
THREE GORGES 
WATER 
CONSERVANCY 
AND ELECTRIC 
POWER CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.035595
CHONGQING 
JIULONG 
ELECTRIC 
POWER 
CO.,LTD 
2002 -0.014958
2003 0.030438 2003 0.024314 2003 0.0024987
2004 0.005867 2004 -0.08562 2004 0.0307792
2005 -0.01334 2005 -0.01908 2005 -0.003627
2006 0.0039 2006 0.001369 2006 -0.006341
2007 -0.02819 2007 0.01672 2007 -0.014064
2008 -0.00073 2008 0.011616 2008 -0.02078
2009 0.020003 2009 0.015081 2009 0.0264913
GD POWER 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO., LTD 
2002 -0.03989 
SHANGHAI 
ELECTRIC 
POWER CO.,LTD.
2002 -0.27258
TOP 
ENERGY 
CO.,LTD 
2002 0.0144688
2003 0.049869 2003 -0.34402 2003 0.0860512
2004 -0.0689 2004 0.051283 2004 0.0388369
2005 -0.0619 2005 0.381531 2005 -0.058087
2006 -0.02484 2006 0.242686 2006 -0.088147
2007 -0.03224 2007 -0.33312 2007 0.0275613
2008 -0.02642 2008 -0.12518 2008 -0.014157
2009 0.204311 2009 0.39941 2009 -0.006528
HUADIAN 
POWER 
INTERNATION
AL CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.021555 
SHENERGY 
CO.,LTD 
2002 -0.0129   
2003 -0.02872 2003 0.002409   
2004 -0.03308 2004 0.035431   
2005 0.030768 2005 -0.01499   
2006 0.019901 2006 -0.03317   
2007 -0.02004 2007 0.035471   
2008 0.008897 2008 -0.00718   
2009 0.000721 2009 -0.00508   
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Earnings Management of Companies in Real Estate Industry 
From the table below, we can see from 2002 to 2009 there are 32 observations in 
Real Estate Industry with negative EDA, suggesting the enterprises made downward 
earnings management, and the maximum extent is -0.15; while another 32 
observations showing positive EDA, indicating enterprises made income-increasing 
earnings management and the maximum extent is 0.17.  
The enterprise which made the maximum upward and downward earnings 
management is the same firm—SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD.  
During observation period the average earnings management of sample 
companies is 3.13E-08 suggesting that the whole industry executed an upward 
earnings management. 
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Table 2.4：Earnings Management Measurement in Real Estate Industry 2002-2009 
 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
XI’AN  GREE 
REAL ESTATE 
CO.,LTD 
2002 -0.01983 
SHANGHAI 
SHIMAO 
CO.,LTD 
2002 -0.04579
BEIJING 
CAPITAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.103837
2003 0.011975 2003 0.077664 2003 -0.05762
2004 0.019295 2004 -0.03062 2004 -0.03567
2005 -0.01292 2005 -0.00839 2005 -0.01374
2006 -0.00998 2006 0.030284 2006 -0.01166
2007 0.002773 2007 -0.06163 2007 0.005909
2008 0.01436 2008 0.036309 2008 0.003358
2009 -0.00568 2009 0.00217 2009 0.005581
SHANGHAI 
INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.05403 
SHANGHAI WAI 
GAOQIAO FREE 
TRADE ZONE 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.064475
NINGBO FUDA 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 -0.00325
2003 0.165086 2003 -0.09142 2003 0.042353
2004 -0.03695 2004 0.053698 2004 -0.07325
2005 -0.00923 2005 0.037644 2005 0.008913
2006 0.132836 2006 0.086735 2006 0.048047
2007 -0.15243 2007 0.058003 2007 -0.04503
2008 -0.08716 2008 -0.12787 2008 -0.0124
2009 -0.06619 2009 -0.08127 2009 0.034618
GEMDALE 
CORPORATION 
2002 0.019274 
 
BEIJING 
VANTONE  
REAL ESTATE 
CO.,LTD 
2002 -0.00362   
2003 -0.07713 2003 -0.0088   
2004 0.007178 2004 0.022724   
2005 0.053423 2005 -0.0126   
2006 -0.08471 2006 -0.02868   
2007 0.077771 2007 0.023713   
2008 0.044157 2008 -0.01438   
2009 -0.03996 2009 0.021654   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
Earnings Management of Companies in Building Industry 
From the table below, we can see from 2002 to 2009 there are 33 observations in 
Building Industry with negative EDA, suggesting the enterprises made downward 
earnings management, and the maximum extent is -0.40; while 31 observations 
showing positive EDA, indicating enterprises made income-increasing earnings 
management, and the maximum extent is 0.36.  
Both the upward and downward earnings management is approximately at the 
same level as the Power, Gas and Water Production and Supply Industries. The 
earnings management of ZHEJIANG HANGXIAO STEEL STRUCTURE CO., LTD. is the 
highest in the industry.  
During observation period the average earnings management of sample 
companies is 2.38E-07, suggesting that the whole industry executed an upward 
earnings management.  
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Table 2.5：Earnings Management Measurement in Building Industry 2002-2009 
 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
BEIJING URBAN 
CONSTRUCTION 
INVESTMENT& 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.325142 
LONGJIAN 
ROAD & 
BRIDGE 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.009608
SHANGHAI 
TUNNEL 
ENGINEERING 
CO., LTD. 
2002 -0.015192
2003 -0.12936 2003 -0.03538 2003 -0.196278
2004 -0.1216 2004 -0.00727 2004 0.0130304
2005 -0.02931 2005 0.013692 2005 0.0285371
2006 -0.02314 2006 0.021476 2006 0.1342703
2007 -0.04985 2007 -0.0026 2007 0.0062261
2008 -0.0161 2008 -0.02093 2008 0.0130621
2009 0.044228 2009 0.0214 2009 0.0163435
CHINA 
GEZHOUBA 
GROUP 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 -0.13744 
SHANGHAI 
CONSTRUCTION 
GROUP CO., LTD
2002 -0.0086
TENGDA 
CONSTRUCTION 
GROUP CO., 
LTD. 
2002 0.0205575
2003 0.205251 2003 0.01524 2003 0.0471286
2004 -0.0177 2004 0.001053 2004 -0.08444
2005 -0.05619 2005 -0.02627 2005 -0.001439
2006 -0.03959 2006 -0.00812 2006 0.0295401
2007 0.150551 2007 0.028986 2007 -0.003778
2008 -0.10461 2008 -0.004 2008 0.0123829
2009 -0.00027 2009 0.001724 2009 -0.019952
ZHEJIANG 
HANGXIAO 
STEEL 
STRUCTURE 
CO.,LTD 
2002 0.01092 
SICHUAN ROAD 
& BRIDGE 
CO.,LTD 
2002 -0.00479    
2003 0.247923 2003 0.017984    
2004 -0.39745 2004 0.025996    
2005 0.115082 2005 0.055466    
2006 -0.00121 2006 0.075189    
2007 0.361532 2007 0.020047    
2008 -0.17789 2008 -0.00476    
2009 -0.1589 2009 -0.18513    
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Earnings Management of Companies in Transportation and Storage Industries 
From the table below, we can see from 2002 to 2009 there are 33 observations in 
Transportation and Storage Industries with negative EDA, suggesting the enterprises 
made downward earnings management, and the maximum extent is -0.26; while 31 
observations showing positive EDA, indicating enterprises made income-increasing 
earnings management, and the maximum extent is 0.33.  
Both the upward and downward earnings management is little lower than the 
Power, Gas and Water Production and Supply Industries and Building Industry. The 
earnings management of TIANJIN PORT (GROUP) CO., LTD., COSCO SHIPPING CO., 
LTD. and GUANGZHOU BAIYUN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT CO., LTD. are 
relatively high in the industry.  
During observation period the average earnings management of sample 
companies is -4.7E-09, suggesting that the whole industry executed a downward 
earnings management. 
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Table 2.6： Earnings Management Measurement in Transportation and Storage 
Industries, 2002-2009 
 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
GUANGZHOU 
BAIYUN 
INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORT 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.107145 
JIANGSU 
EXPRESSWAY 
CO.,LTD  
2002 0.010995
XIAMEN 
INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORT 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.0025981
2003 0.043632 2003 -0.03074 2003 0.0008622
2004 -0.13883 2004 0.01915 2004 -0.012494
2005 0.02457 2005 0.018276 2005 0.0053858
2006 0.046271 2006 -0.01521 2006 0.0073383
2007 -0.04163 2007 0.030904 2007 -0.009009
2008 -0.13014 2008 -0.03248 2008 -0.026733
2009 0.088977 2009 -0.0009 2009 0.0320519
CHINA 
EASTERN 
AIRLINES 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 -0.00531 
TIANJIN 
PORT(GROUP) 
CO., LTD. 
2002 0.273031
COSCO 
SHIPPING 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.0341034
2003 -0.03247 2003 -0.02557 2003 -0.11897
2004 -0.06513 2004 -0.26216 2004 -0.176375
2005 0.034469 2005 0.040488 2005 0.0473393
2006 -0.00296 2006 -0.25821 2006 0.0745219
2007 0.003045 2007 -0.08307 2007 0.0552685
2008 -0.04838 2008 -0.0118 2008 0.1251472
2009 0.116742 2009 0.327295 2009 -0.041035
SHANGHAI JIN 
JIANG 
INTERNATIONAL 
INDUSTRIAL 
INVESTMENT 
CO.,LTD  
2002 -0.02671 
CHINA 
RAILWAY 
TIELONG 
CONTAINER 
LOGISTICS CO., 
LTD. 
2002 0.076827       
2003 0.019564 2003 -0.00491       
2004 0.061263 2004 0.015125       
2005 -0.0228 2005 -0.02231       
2006 -0.0054 2006 -0.05802    
2007 -0.04231 2007 -0.0718    
2008 -0.03722 2008 0.076314    
2009 0.053605 2009 -0.01123    
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Earnings Management of Companies in Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry 
and Fishery Industries 
From the table below, we can see from 2002 to 2009 there are 30 observations in 
Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery Industries with negative EDA, 
suggesting the enterprises made downward earnings management, and the maximum 
extent is -0.15; while 34 observations showing positive EDA, indicating enterprises 
made income-increasing earnings management, and the maximum extent is 0.097.    
The upward and downward earnings management of DAHU AGRICULTURE CO., 
LTD. is relatively high.  
During observation period the average earnings management of sample 
companies is 1.61E-07, suggesting that the whole industry executed an upward 
earnings management. 
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Table 2.7： Earnings Management Measurement in Farming, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry and Fishery Industries, 2002-2009 
 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
HEILONGJIANG 
AGRICULTURE 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.043544 
 
HUNAN 
NEW 
WELLFUL 
CO.LTD. 
2002 0.008027
SICHUAN 
HEJIA CO.LTD. 
2002 0.006818
2003 -0.10329 2003 -0.00175 2003 -0.00058
2004 0.061204 2004 0.025463 2004 -0.00424
2005 0.0128 2005 -0.02943 2005 -0.00709
2006 0.002249 2006 -0.0929 2006 0.016067
2007 -0.01589 2007 0.08982 2007 0.014595
2008 -0.03188 2008 0.013911 2008 -0.01349
2009 0.031255 2009 -0.01314 2009 -0.01207
DAHU 
AGRICULTURE 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.023234 
 
GANSU 
YASHENG 
INDUSTRIAL
（GROUP）
CO.,LTD  
2002 0.001389
 
SHANGHAI 
KAICHUANG 
MARINE 
INTERNATIONAL 
CO.,LTD  
2002 -0.01012
2003 0.030611 2003 -0.00314 2003 -0.05752
2004 -0.03053 2004 -0.01705 2004 0.063547
2005 -0.0222 2005 -0.01265 2005 -0.00066
2006 -0.0045 2006 -0.01256 2006 -0.04512
2007 0.051193 2007 0.019213 2007 0.097482
2008 0.095032 2008 0.014752 2008 -0.11198
2009 -0.14284 2009 0.010051 2009 0.064365
TONGWEI 
CO.,LTD  
2002 0.052486 
XINJIANG 
TIANYE 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.023914       
2003 0.008171 2003 -0.15434       
2004 -0.05433 2004 0.063552       
2005 0.014493 2005 0.086975       
2006 -0.135 2006 -0.00811    
2007 0.048494 2007 -0.03073    
2008 0.054329 2008 0.007857    
2009 0.011357 2009 0.010884    
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Earnings Management of Companies in Wholesale and Retail Trade Industries 
From the table below, we can see from 2002 to 2009 there are 37 observations in 
Wholesale and Retail Trade Industries with negative EDA, suggesting the enterprises 
made downward earnings management, and the maximum extent is -0.21; while 27 
observations showing positive EDA, indicating enterprises made income-increasing 
earnings management and the maximum extent is 0.51.  
The upward and downward earnings management of SHANGHAI NEW WORLD 
CO., LTD. is highest (its upward earnings management is even higher), followed by 
SINOCHEM INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION.  
During observation period the average earnings management of sample 
companies is -1.3E-08, suggesting that the whole industry executed a downward 
earnings management. 
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Table 2.8：Earnings Management Measurement in Wholesale and Retail Trade 
Industries, 2002-2009 
 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
SHANGHAI 
BAILIAN 
GROUP 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 -0.01088 
XIAMEN 
INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE GROUP 
CO., LTD. 
2002 -0.01224
CNTIC 
TRADING CO., 
LTD. 
2002 0.0260869
2003 -0.02925 2003 0.025056 2003 -0.047978
2004 0.022338 2004 0.083504 2004 0.0221596
2005 -0.0039 2005 -0.09156 2005 0.0085759
2006 0.004409 2006 -0.02379 2006 -0.023086
2007 0.026972 2007 0.031491 2007 0.0158818
2008 -0.0079 2008 -0.0269 2008 -7.03E-06
2009 -0.00179 2009 0.01444 2009 -0.001633
SHANGHAI 
LANSHENG 
CORPORATION 
 
2002 0.007846 
SHANGHAI 
NEW WORLD 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 -0.01637
SINOCHEM 
INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATION  
2002 -0.029427
2003 -0.01217 2003 -6.2E-05 2003 0.0831143
2004 0.069125 2004 0.098902 2004 0.1264609
2005 -0.01125 2005 -0.05323 2005 -0.116448
2006 -0.06879 2006 -0.20838 2006 -0.171853
2007 0.024899 2007 -0.15035 2007 -0.030385
2008 0.016442 2008 0.509986 2008 -0.028778
2009 -0.0261 2009 -0.18049 2009 0.1673154
 
BEIJING 
WANGFUJING 
DEPARTMENT 
STORE 
(GROUP)CO.,LTD. 
2002 -0.01958 
 
SHANGHAI 
FRIENDSHIP 
GROUP 
INCORPORATED 
COMPANY  
2002 0.012433       
2003 0.063678 2003 -0.00898       
2004 -0.05378 2004 -0.00169       
2005 0.012859 2005 -0.01624       
2006 -0.03258 2006 -0.00252    
2007 0.059862 2007 0.005439    
2008 0.012386 2008 0.016936    
2009 -0.04285 2009 -0.00538    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
 
Earnings Management of Companies in Social Service Industry 
From the table below, we can see from 2002 to 2009 there are 36 observations in 
Social Service Industry with negative EDA, suggesting the enterprises made 
downward earnings management, and the maximum extent is -0.52; while 28 
observations showing positive EDA, indicating enterprises made income-increasing 
earnings management and the maximum extent is 1.12.  
Both the upward and downward earnings management is at the highest 
level over 12 Industries. The earnings management of TIANJIN CAPITAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP PROTECTION CO., LTD. and HUANGSHAN TOURISM 
DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. is relatively high in the industry.  
During observation period the average earnings management of sample 
companies is -6.2E-08, suggesting that the whole industry executed a downward 
earnings management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
Table 2.9：Earnings Management Measurement in Social Service Industry, 2002-2009 
 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
TIANJIN CAPITAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
GROUP 
PROTECTION CO., 
LTD. 
2002 -0.46809 
SHANGHAI 
JINJIANG 
INTERNATIO
NAL HOTELS 
DEVELOPME
NT CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.026932
BEIJING 
CAPITAL 
CO.,LTD 
2002 -0.03777
2003 1.120592 2003 0.046065 2003 -0.00027
2004 -0.12676 2004 -0.00436 2004 -0.06386
2005 0.096181 2005 -0.03351 2005 -0.01418
2006 -0.08995 2006 0.010717 2006 -0.00467
2007 -0.39796 2007 -0.03142 2007 0.117963
2008 -0.05853 2008 -0.00155 2008 0.008654
2009 -0.07549 2009 -0.01288 2009 -0.00587
DAZHONG 
TRANSPORTATIO
N（GROUP）
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.008243 
 
CHINA 
UNITED 
TRAVEL 
COMPANY 
LIMITED 
2002 -0.02405
SHANDONG 
EXPRESSWA
Y COMPANY 
LIMITED 
2002 -0.05575
2003 -0.04774 2003 0.082543 2003 0.008243
2004 0.019625 2004 0.000631 2004 -0.09339
2005 0.01688 2005 0.041739 2005 0.274449
2006 -0.01109 2006 -0.04667 2006 -0.10691
2007 -0.00906 2007 -0.03106 2007 0.06646
2008 0.018317 2008 0.020306 2008 0.009148
2009 0.00482 2009 -0.04344 2009 -0.10225
 
HUANGSHAN 
TOURISM 
DEVELOPMENT 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 -0.51836 
 
SHANGHAI 
QIANGSHEN
G HOLDING 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.007225       
2003 0.172258 2003 0.005612       
2004 0.024754 2004 0.067523       
2005 0.321843 2005 -0.05983       
2006 0.444827 2006 -0.0716    
2007 -0.18842 2007 -0.03551    
2008 -0.12342 2008 0.090564    
2009 -0.13349 2009 -0.00398    
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Earnings Management of Companies in Information Technology Industry 
From the table below, we can see from 2002 to 2009 there are 34 observations in 
Information Technology Industry with negative EDA, suggesting the enterprises made 
downward earnings management, and the maximum extent is -0.34; while 30 
observations showing positive EDA, indicating enterprises made income-increasing 
earnings management, and the maximum extent is 0.59.  
The earnings management of SHANGHAI EAST-CHINA COMPUTER CO., LTD, 
and FUJIAN START GROUP CO. LTD. is relatively high in the industry.  
During observation period the average earnings management of sample 
companies is 4.69E-09, suggesting that the whole industry executed an upward 
earnings management.  
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Table 2.10：Earnings Management Measurement in Information Technology Industry, 
2002-2009 
 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
 
WUHAN 
YANGTZE 
COMMUNIC
ATION 
INDUSTRY 
GROUP 
CO.,LTD 
2002 0.018333 
 
JIANGSU 
HONGTU HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY 
CO.,LTD 
2002 -0.09111
 
FUJIAN START 
GROUP CO. 
LTD. 
2002 -0.191322
2003 0.002604 2003 0.006064 2003 0.0931483
2004 0.029573 2004 0.044271 2004 -0.070806
2005 -0.01963 2005 -0.01192 2005 -0.054493
2006 -0.02495 2006 0.049741 2006 -0.083861
2007 0.045274 2007 0.07401 2007 0.5939111
2008 -0.00024 2008 -0.014 2008 -0.212498
2009 -0.05097 2009 -0.05705 2009 -0.07408
FOUNDER 
TECHNOLOG
Y GROUP 
CORP. 
2002 0.035847 
SHANGHAI 
EAST-CHINA 
COMPUTER 
CO.,LTD 
2002 0.174536
CHINA 
UNITED 
NETWORK 
COMMUNICAT
IONS LIMITED 
2002 0.0278581
2003 0.095485 2003 -0.00966 2003 -0.081031
2004 -0.16631 2004 -0.04098 2004 -0.155165
2005 -0.02516 2005 -0.33907 2005 0.0301986
2006 0.084442 2006 0.244478 2006 0.040878
2007 -0.03047 2007 -0.15168 2007 0.0821606
2008 0.037168 2008 0.157214 2008 0.0447338
2009 -0.031 2009 -0.03484 2009 0.0103663
SHANGHAI 
FEILO 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.076518 
SHANGHAI 
POTEVIO 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.026421       
2003 -0.03838 2003 0.003821       
2004 -0.01521 2004 -0.03827       
2005 -0.01515 2005 -0.01456       
2006 0.056589 2006 -0.00838    
2007 0.049933 2007 0.029961    
2008 -0.02281 2008 0.026778    
2009 -0.09149 2009 -0.02577    
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Earnings Management of Companies in Manufacturing Industry 
From the table below, we can see from 2002 to 2009 there are 34 observations in 
Manufacturing Industry with negative EDA, suggesting the enterprises made 
downward earnings management, and the maximum extent is -0.14; while 30 
observations showing positive EDA, indicating enterprises made income-increasing 
earnings management, and the maximum extent is 0.17. 
The earnings management of LAO FENG XIANG CO., LTD. and NINGBO 
SHANSHAN CO., LTD. is relatively high in the industry.  
During observation period the average earnings management of sample 
companies is 8.67E-19, suggesting that the whole industry executed an upward 
earnings management, but with tiny level. 
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Table 2.11：Earnings Management Measurement in Manufacturing Industry, 2002-2009 
 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
 
SHANGHAI 
FOSUN 
PHARMACEUTI
CAL (GROUP) 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 -0.06274 
 
HENAN 
LIANHUA 
GOURMET 
POWDER 
CO.LTD. 
2002 0.018222
NINGBO 
SHANSHAN 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.0739108
2003 0.097457 2003 -0.03439 2003 -0.011484
2004 -0.05897 2004 -0.00564 2004 -0.128137
2005 0.035155 2005 -0.00128 2005 0.0124865
2006 0.050361 2006 -0.00577 2006 -0.010159
2007 -0.01492 2007 0.014323 2007 0.0628653
2008 0.051356 2008 0.000181 2008 0.1282138
2009 -0.0977 2009 0.014358 2009 -0.127697
BRIGHT 
DAIRY & 
FOOD 
CO.,LTD 
2002 -0.02018 
QINGDAO 
HAIER CO.，
LTD 
2002 0.031104
CHINA CSSC 
HOLDINGS 
LIMITED 
2002 0.0877412
2003 0.007422 2003 -0.01475 2003 0.0273623
2004 0.017047 2004 0.049655 2004 0.0102784
2005 -0.01923 2005 -0.00557 2005 -0.043492
2006 -0.01873 2006 -0.06672 2006 -0.073768
2007 -0.00994 2007 -0.03171 2007 -0.016542
2008 0.010803 2008 0.016082 2008 0.0126409
2009 0.032807 2009 0.021917 2009 -0.004221
 
LAO FENG 
XIANG 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.171288 
 
SANY 
HEAVY 
INDUSTRY 
CO.,LTD 
2002 -0.05337       
2003 -0.13671 2003 -0.04478       
2004 -0.00368 2004 0.009308       
2005 -0.03676 2005 -0.03884       
2006 -0.02801 2006 0.049746    
2007 -0.00141 2007 0.082071    
2008 -0.05754 2008 0.007061    
2009 0.092824 2009 -0.0112    
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Earnings Management of Companies in Integrated Industry 
From the table below, we can see from 2002 to 2009 there are 31 observations in 
Integrated Industry with negative EDA, suggesting the enterprises made downward 
earnings management, and the maximum extent is -0.22; while 33 observations 
showing positive EDA, indicating enterprises made income-increasing earnings 
management, and the maximum extent is 0.18.  
During observation period the average earnings management of sample 
companies is 3.25E-07, suggesting that the whole industry executed an upward 
earnings management. 
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Table 2.12：Earnings Management Measurement in Integrated Industry 2002-2009 
 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
Corporate 
Name 
Year EDA 
SHANGHAI 
ORIENTAL 
PEARL(GROU
P) CO.,LTD 
2002 0.001902 
NINGBO 
UNITED 
GROUP 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 -0.01336
JIANGSU 
ZONGYI 
CO.,LTD 
2002 -0.01883
2003 -0.0093 2003 0.038602 2003 -0.01391
2004 0.015027 2004 0.044065 2004 -0.04088
2005 -0.00262 2005 -0.02103 2005 0.035172
2006 -0.00813 2006 -0.0713 2006 -0.01474
2007 -0.00211 2007 -0.06096 2007 0.023469
2008 0.00453 2008 0.154922 2008 0.0317
2009 0.000702 2009 -0.07094 2009 -0.00198
SHANGHAI 
FUDAN  FOR
WARD S&T 
CO., LTD 
2002 0.012348  
ZHEJIANG 
CHINA 
LIGHT&TEXTILE 
INDUSTRIAL 
CITY GROUP 
CO.,LTD. 
 
2002 0.041499
 
SHANGHAI 
ZHANGJIANG 
HI-TECH PARK 
DEVELOPMENT 
Co.,LTD. 
2002 0.057021
2003 0.054497 2003 0.011042 2003 -0.01113
2004 -0.18291 2004 0.045497 2004 0.018635
2005 0.062373 2005 -0.10199 2005 0.169284
2006 0.040964 2006 0.012066 2006 -0.07161
2007 0.108658 2007 -0.11152 2007 -0.22143
2008 0.126657 2008 -0.07945 2008 0.073672
2009 -0.22258 2009 0.182863 2009 -0.01444
SHANGHAI 
JIABAO 
INDUSTRY & 
COMMERCE 
(GROUP) 
CO.,LTD 
2002 -0.00436 
SHANGHAI 
TONGJI SCIENCE 
& TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRIAL 
CO.,LTD. 
2002 0.016073   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
    
2003 -0.0009 2003 0.003449     
2004 -0.00725 2004 -0.13249     
2005 0.000491 2005 0.050583     
2006 -0.00252 2006 0.006777     
2007 0.038958 2007 0.063857     
2008 -0.02126 2008 0.06171     
2009 -0.00316 2009 -0.06995     
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3.3.4 Summary on earnings management of Chinese listed companies 
To sum up, through reviewing theoretical and empirical research on earnings 
management, we adopt Modified-Jones Model to measure the earnings management 
of sample companies, and at the same time made an effective analysis on the trend of 
earnings management. The main research findings are summarized as follows:  
Earnings management in different industries: firms from 9 industries out of 
12 exaggerate profits by increasing their discretionary accruals, firms from 3 
industries make downward earnings management to hide profits; among them, sample 
companies in Social Services Industry show the highest earnings management level. 
The whole industry made downward adjustment on discretionary accruals to hide 
profits; firms in Communication and Culture Industry show the lowest earnings 
management level. The whole industry made an upward adjustment on discretionary 
accruals to exaggerate profits.  
Trend in earnings management: from 2002 to 2009, the average earnings 
management of 93 sample companies gradually declined in fluctuation. The result 
shows that the overall earnings management level of listed companies is declining, 
and the accounting information quality of Chinese listed companies has seen an 
obvious improvement in recent years. 
 
 
Figure 2: Trend in average earnings management of 93 sample companies 2002-2009 
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4. Analysis on Board Governance 
 
As the board is not directly involved in the daily operation and management of 
the firm, its impact on firm’s earnings is indirect. The governance structure of the 
board may affect the effectiveness of its role as decision-making and monitoring, 
which will indirectly affect the earnings management behavior.  
In the circumstances that other factors affect earnings management equally, in 
the company where the board could effectively monitor managers and shareholders, 
earnings management behavior can be controlled. Managers cannot abuse their power, 
and controlling shareholders cannot transfer resources for their private benefits. So the 
degree of earnings management will be lower than the company lack of effective 
monitoring mechanisms. Thus better board governance structure will constrain 
earnings management to a greater extent. 
 
4.1 Board governance variables 
 
Through literature review and analysis on board governance structure, we 
introduce four variables: board size, board independence, board duality and board 
meetings, to evaluate the monitoring function of the board. 
Based on samples selected for measuring earnings management of Shanghai 
A-share listed companies in previous chapter and the availability of board governance 
data2, we narrowed our observation period to fiscal year ends between 2006 and 2009, 
and collected sample data on number of board members, number of independent 
directors, whether chairman and CEO is the same person and board meeting 
frequencies for the above four variables. 
 
 
 
                                                        
2 Board data are hand-collected from annual reports of Chinese listed companies. 
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4.2 Explanations of board governance variables and descriptive statistics 
 
Board Size (LN_DN): number of board members disclosed in annual reports of 
sample companies, including chairman, vice chairman, directors and independent 
directors. We will adopt the same measurement of board size proposed by Yu Dongzhi 
and Chi Guohua (2004)3, namely, for company i, board size is described as the 
logarithm ( )itLN DN of board members itDN   (excluding honorary director or 
chairman, candidates of directors and board advisor) disclosed in the annual report in 
year t. Table 3 shows that the minimum number of board members in sample 
companies is 5, and the maximum is 20. The average number of board members is 10. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of board size from 2006 to 2009 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
DN 10 2.302167 5 20 N=372 
T=4 
n= 93  
LN_DN 2.295233 0.2240569 1.609438 2.995732 N=372 
T=4 
n= 93 
Note: n=number of sample companies; T=observation year; N =n*T 
 
 
Board Independence (IND)：number of independent directors employed by listed 
companies during the reporting period according to the disclosed information in 
annual reports, denoted as itIND . Table 4 shows that the number of independent 
directors in sample companies is up to 10, low to 1, and the average number is 4. 
 
 
                                                        
3 Yu Dongzhi and Chi Guohua (2004) “board size, stability and Corporate Performance: 
Theoretical and empirical analysis” [J], Economic Research, Vol.4. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of board independence from 2006 to 2009 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
IND 4 0.9421543 1 10 N=372 
T=4 
n= 93 
Note: n=number of sample companies; T=observation year; N =n*T 
 
Board Duality (DUA)：according to the disclosed information in annual reports of 
sample companies, if chairman of the board and general manager is the same person, 
then DUA=1, otherwise DUA=0. Table 5 indicates that in the 93 sample companies, 
only less than one tenth of the companies whose chairman also serves as general 
manager, and this situation tends to decrease in the observation period. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of board duality from 2006 to 2009 
 
Variable 2006 2007 2008 2009 Observations 
DUA=1 9 6 6 7 n= 93 
Note: n =number of sample companies 
 
Board Meetings (MEET) / individual characteristics of the board：according to 
the disclosed information in annual reports of sample companies, board meetings is 
calculated by deducting meetings held by means of communication from the total 
board meetings during the reporting period. Due to these specific features of the 
company generally cannot be fully reflected in companies’ annual reports, it will be 
regarded as unobservable variable iα . 
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5. Theoretical Hypotheses and Empirical Test on Board Governance and 
Earnings Management 
 
In order to prove the role of the board as monitoring and constraining earnings 
management, we will conduct empirical test on the relations between board 
governance and earnings management of Chinese listed companies, where board 
governance can be measured through board size, board independence, board duality 
and board meetings. 
 
5.1 Theoretical hypotheses 
 
5.1.1 Board size and earnings management 
A large body of academic literature from China and abroad have proved that 
board size, namely the number of board members, plays an important role in board 
monitoring efficiency, and also significantly influences earnings management of 
enterprises. But current studies do not draw consistent conclusion.  
Some research find that a smaller board is more efficient, because 
communication and coordination between board members is much easier, and a small 
board can react to the problems in daily operation more quickly. While other studies 
suggest that a large board can offer better external resources, and by attracting more 
directors with business management experience and extensive finance knowledge into 
the board, the decision-making of the board will be more professional. A smaller 
board is likely to be controlled by internal management, leaving the board out of 
power. While a larger board will bring in more outside directors, which will reduce 
the level of internal control and increase board independence, thereby the board will 
play an effective monitoring role. Based on the analysis above, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H1: Earnings management is negatively associated with board size, namely, the 
larger the board size, the lower level of earnings management. 
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5.1.2 Board independence and earnings management 
The purpose of introducing independent directors to the board is to further 
improve corporate governance structure, and to better regulate listed companies’ 
operations. Increasing the proportion of independent outside directors in the board can 
reduce the level of internal control and increase board independence, thus help the 
board better fulfill its responsibilities. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Earnings management is negatively associated with the independence of the 
board of directors, namely, the more independent directors in the board, the 
lower level of earnings management. 
 
 
5.1.3 Board duality and earnings management 
To some extent, whether the chairman and general manager is the same person 
reflects board independence. According to agency theory and transaction cost theory, 
in the case that chairman and general manager is the same person, the opportunistic 
behavior of managers and the agency loss will increase. Also there will be conflicts 
between two different functions, which make it difficult to protect the benefit of 
shareholders and other stakeholders. A large number of domestic and foreign 
empirical studies have proved that the board with chairman serves as general manager 
is difficult to impose effective monitoring on management. And China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) regards the separation of the roles of chairman and 
CEO as an important method to improve corporate governance. Therefore, we test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Earnings management is negatively associated with the separation of the 
roles of CEO and board chair, namely, the separation will reduce the level of 
earnings management. 
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5.1.4 Board meetings and earnings management 
Board meetings mechanism is also one aspect of general concern in theoretical 
studies on board governance. Current studies have not reached consistent conclusion 
on the functions of board meetings. However, considering the reality of China's 
capital market, when the inside managers manipulate the earnings, they naturally want 
to reduce or distract the concern of such matters from outside directors, and reducing 
the frequency of board meetings is an effective way. Because the more frequent of 
board meetings, the more chances of board members vote on matters involving 
earnings management; contrarily, the fewer board meetings, its members may not pay 
attention to such matters. Therefore, the higher frequency of board meetings may 
reduce earnings management. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: Earnings management is negatively associated with board meeting 
frequency, that is, the higher frequency of board meetings, the lower level of 
earnings management. 
 
 
5.2 Empirical test on board governance and earnings management 
 
5.2.1 Panel data model 
In order to examine the above hypotheses, we setup the following regression 
model taking earnings management as explained variable, board size, board 
independence, board duality and board meetings as explanatory variables, to test the 
impact of board governance on the extent of earnings management. 
After controlling for corporate size LnCSIZE (logarithm of year-end total assets), 
return on equity ROE (net income/ equity) and other factors, we should notice that 
board size, board composition and board duality may be endogenously determined by 
earnings management, firm performance and other variables. If we conduct OLS 
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regression without considering endogenous variables, there will be a large bias in the 
model. Therefore, we will use Panel Data Model to solve the endogenous problems of 
unobservable variables in company board. 
 
Panel Data Model is set as follows： 
0 1 2 3 4 5it it it it it it i itEDA LNCSIZE ROE LNDN IND DUAα α α α α α α μ= + + + + + + +  
Where, 
 i = 1, 2, ... .., 93, denotes 93 sample listed companies in Table 1; 
t=2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, denotes observation years; 
denotes the features of each board that is independent of time, i.e. unobservable 
characteristics of the board 
 
In order to be consistent with observation years of board governance variables, 
we adopt EDA data from 2006 to 2009 in Table 2.1-2.12. 
Generally speaking, panel data is estimated according to fixed effect and random 
effect. A Fixed Effect Model is estimated by least squares dummy variable (LSDV); 
while a Random Effect Model is estimated through feasible generalized least squares 
(FGLS) (Greene, 2000). Both of them can greatly take the advantages of panel data, 
and minimize the estimation error. As for which model should we use, it will depend 
on the results of Hausman Test. 
According to Panel Data Model, iα  features of each board that is independent of 
time, is difficult to be quantified or directly observed in most cases. Thus it will be 
explained from fixed effect and random effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
iα
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5.2.2 Fixed effect model 
First, we adopt fixed effect model4 of static panel data. In fixed effect model, 
individual features are reflected in specific intercept for each firm. By taking iα , 
features of each board as intercept, we get the estimated results as follows5: 
 
  （-4.4756）   （-5.0221）      （-4.1933）     （13.3042）    （-8.0471）    （9.1790） 
 
33.4009=F     0.0071P =  
 
5.2.3 Random effect model 
The reason why dummy variables are introduced in fixed effect model is that 
there is incomplete information on explanatory variables. This can also be solved by 
decomposing the error term to describe the missing information. 
Next we adopt random effect model, which assumes that all individuals have the 
same intercept, and the difference between individual samples is mainly reflected in 
the setting of random error. However, random effect model is setup under one 
assumption: individual effects (random errors) are not correlated to other explanatory 
variables. As board meeting is not correlated to board size, board independence and 
board duality, we take iα , features of each board (board meetings) as random error 
and detailed regression results are as follows: 
（-7.0027）   （-3.0594）    （-6.8763）     （15.4700）    （-13.6985）    （9.2690） 
 
86.6102F =     0.0012P =  
                                                        
4 In panel data model, if for different cross-sections or different time series, the intercept is 
different, dummy variables can be introduced into the model to estimate regression 
parameters.  
5 The important reason for using EVIEWS6.0 here is that it can directly show estimates of 
unobservable features. 
0.048978 0.008895 0.002715 0.126085 0.012877 0.050883it it it it it itEDA LNCSIZE ROE LNDN IND DUA= − − − + − +
0.104463 0.000248 0.025154 0.067115 0.012793 0.024318it it it it it itEDA LNCSIZE ROE LNDN IND DUA= − − − + − +
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5.2.4 Regression results analysis 
The value of F-statistics, which suggests the overall effectiveness of model, is 
33.4009 under fixed effect regression model and 86.6102 under random effect model. 
Meanwhile the corresponding P-values are 0.0071 and 0.0012 respectively, indicating 
both of the fixed effect and random effect model passed significant test, and the 
regression model is effective. 
The regression coefficients of board size ( )itLN DN  are positive, which is the 
opposite of predicted sign. T- statistics are 13.3042 and 15.4700 under fixed effect and 
random effect model respectively, both statistically significant at 5% significance 
level. The regression results suggest that Hypothesis1 is not supported as the larger 
board of directors of listed companies or the greater number of board members, the 
higher degree of earnings management in the company. 
The regression coefficients of board independence (IND) are negative, which is 
consistent with the predicted sign, and both of the t-statistics passed significant test. 
The results indicate that the larger number of independent directors, the lower level of 
earnings management. This provides support for Hypothesis 2. 
The regression coefficients of board duality (DUA) are positive and t-statistics 
passed significant test. The results show that the separation of the roles of CEO and 
board chair will reduce the extent of earnings management, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 3. 
For the control variables, the coefficients of return on equity (ROE) are negative, 
indicating that ROE is negatively correlated to earnings management. According to 
the practical situation of Chinese listed companies, ROE of most companies is 
ranging from little profit to 10%, so the manipulation of earnings in Chinese listed 
companies is relatively large. The coefficients of corporate size LnCSIZE are negative, 
suggesting that the larger size of Chinese listed companies, the less extent of earnings 
management.  
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5.2.5 Hausman test and conclusions 
For the fixed effect and random effect model above, we will run 
HAUSMAN-WU test to determine which effect can better explain the regression 
model. The basic idea is, under the assumption that iα  is independent from other 
explanatory variables, the coefficients estimated from fixed effect model and random 
effect model are unbiased and consistent, except that fixed effect model is not 
effective. If the assumption does not hold, it is still consistent estimation of 
coefficients under fixed effect model, but not for random effect model. Therefore, 
under the original assumption, coefficients estimated from both models should not 
have significant differences. So we can conduct statistical test based on the 
differences of coefficients. 
 
Table 6: Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
  
Pool: TT    
Test cross-section random effects  
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Cross-section random 2.693211 5 0.7472 
 
Hausman Test in Table 7 shows that under the random effect assumption, 
2 (5)x  
statistic is 2.693211 and P-Value is 0.7472, indicating that we cannot reject the 
random effect assumption where board feature iα  is taken as random error. 
Therefore, we accept random effect model. After controlling for corporate size 
LnCSIZE (logarithm of year-end total assets), return on equity ROE (net income/ 
equity) and other factors, we draw the following conclusions from random effect 
regression model: 
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(1) Earnings management of Chinese listed companies is positively associated 
with board size. 
This empirical finding indicates that a smaller board is more efficient, because 
communication and coordination between board members is more convenient, and a 
small board will react to earnings management more quickly. It provides support for 
Agency Theory and Organizational Behavior Theory. And our empirical result is also 
consistent with the empirical findings of Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al (1998) and 
Wu (2000) which indentify evidence small board of directors is doing better than 
relatively large board of directors in monitoring managers. 
 
 
(2) Earnings management of Chinese listed companies is negatively associated 
with board independence 
This empirical result suggests that the larger number of independent directors, 
the lower level of earnings management. This is based on Agency Theory that the 
ability of the board to act as an effective monitor is dependent upon its independence 
from management. And our empirical finding is consistent with most of the empirical 
results on this field, namely, the likelihood of managers making income-increasing 
abnormal accruals is negatively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board. 
This result also reflects the introduction of independent director system in China 
has made some achievements. Independent directors are playing an important role to 
improve the board governance of Chinese listed companies. Although there are still 
many areas for improvement on independent director system, the influence of 
independent directors is gradually increasing as independent directors begin to closely 
take part in firm management, monitoring and presenting a series of independent 
views, which helps to reduce earnings management. 
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(3) Earnings management of Chinese listed companies is negatively associated 
with the separation of the roles of CEO and board chair. 
This empirical finding indicates that the separation of the roles of CEO and 
board chair will reduce the level of earnings management. This is based on Agency 
Theory that if CEO and board chair is the same person, it will be difficult to impose 
effective monitoring on management. And it is consistent with the empirical findings 
of Dechow et al (1996) and Beasley (1996) which point out if the board is controlled 
by general manager, earnings management is more likely to occur. 
The result also provides evidence for the instruction of China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), namely, separating the roles of chairman and CEO 
is an important method to improve corporate governance of Chinese listed companies. 
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6. Conclusions and Suggestions 
 
Excessive earnings management reduces the reliability of accounting information 
of listed companies, thereby misleads the users in decision-making and damages the 
companies’ reputation. Through detailed systematic research on earnings management, 
board governance, and the relations between board governance and earnings 
management of Chinese listed companies, our main findings are summarized as 
follows: 
 
6.1 Earnings management of Chinese listed companies 
Through reviewing theoretical and empirical research on earnings management, 
we adopt Modified-Jones Model to measure the extent of earnings management of 
Chinese listed companies. Based on the measurement results, we find that: 
(1) Earnings management in different industries: 9 industries out of 12 exaggerate the 
profits through upward earnings management, 3 industries hide the profits through 
downward earnings management. Social Services Industry shows the highest 
earnings management level, while Communication and Culture Industry show the 
lowest earnings management level.  
(2) Trend in earnings management: from 2002 to 2009, the average earnings 
management of Chinese listed companies gradually declined in fluctuation. The 
result indicates the quality of accounting information of Chinese listed companies 
has improved obviously in recent years. 
 
6.2 Board governance of Chinese listed companies 
Through literature review and analysis on board governance structure, we 
introduce four variables: board size, board independence, board duality and board 
meetings, to evaluate the monitoring function of the board. 
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The descriptive statistics of the above variables show: the average number of 
board members in Chinese listed companies is 10; while the average number of 
independent directors is 4; only less than one tenth of Chinese listed companies have 
board chair also serves as CEO, and this situation tends to decrease. 
 
6.3 Empirical findings on board governance and earnings management 
By using Panel Data Model, we conduct empirical research on the relations 
between board governance and earnings management of Chinese listed companies. 
After controlling for corporate size, return on equity and other factors, we get the 
following regression results: 
(4) Earnings management of Chinese listed companies is positively correlated to 
board size, that is, a smaller board is more efficient, and will impose more 
effective constraints on earnings management;  
(5) Earnings management of Chinese listed companies is negatively correlated with 
board independence, namely, the more independent directors in the board, the 
stronger constraints on earnings management; 
(6) Earnings management is negatively correlated to the separation of the roles of 
CEO and board chair, that is, the separation of the roles of CEO and board chair 
will reduce the level of earnings management of Chinese listed companies. 
 
Board governance and earnings management constraint problems are of great 
practical and theoretical significance, hope our systematic research on this field will 
provide references for improving accounting information disclosure and corporate 
governance of Chinese listed companies. But due to the reality of China's capital 
market development and research capacity limitations, there are still space for further 
study. 
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Appendix 
 
Regression results for parameter 1α , 2α and 3α  under Modified-Jones Model 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass1      |         
       drvc1 |  -6.37e-11   2.98e-11    -2.14   0.033∗    -1.22e-10   -5.28e-12 
        ppe1 |  -5.79e-12   2.62e-12    -2.21   0.027∗     -1.09e-11   -6.64e-13 
       _cons |  -.0041732   .0155875    -0.27   0.789    -.0347242    .0263778 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass2      |   
       drvc2 |  -4.64e-12   1.39e-12    -3.35   0.001∗     -7.36e-12   -1.92e-12 
        ppe2 |   2.03e-12   1.34e-12     1.51   0.131    -6.01e-13    4.66e-12 
       _cons |  -.0742289    .009753    -7.61   0.000∗     -.0933444   -.0551134 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass3      |   
       drvc3 |   6.22e-11   1.83e-11     3.40   0.001∗      2.63e-11    9.80e-11 
        ppe3 |   3.14e-13   8.99e-12     0.03   0.972    -1.73e-11    1.79e-11 
       _cons |  -.0236155   .0334111    -0.71   0.480    -.0891001    .0418691 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass4      |   
       drvc4 |  -4.11e-11   2.40e-11    -1.71   0.087    -8.82e-11    5.97e-12 
        ppe4 |  -3.40e-10   1.62e-10    -2.10   0.036∗     -6.59e-10   -2.21e-11 
       _cons |   .0616274   .0289098     2.13   0.033∗     .0049653    .1182896 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass5      |   
       drvc5 |  -2.18e-11   2.67e-10    -0.08   0.935    -5.45e-10    5.01e-10 
        ppe5 |   3.81e-11   1.25e-10     0.30   0.761    -2.08e-10    2.84e-10 
       _cons |  -.0850205   .0388054    -2.19   0.028∗    -.1610777   -.0089633 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass6      |   
       drvc6 |   1.47e-11   4.19e-11     0.35   0.725    -6.74e-11    9.69e-11 
        ppe6 |  -1.01e-10   5.04e-11    -1.99   0.046∗     -1.99e-10   -1.65e-12 
       _cons |   .0038873   .0098987     0.39   0.695    -.0155137    .0232884 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass7      |   
       drvc7 |  -1.67e-10   2.57e-11    -6.49   0.000∗     -2.17e-10   -1.16e-10 
        ppe7 |  -5.97e-12   1.50e-11    -0.40   0.691    -3.54e-11    2.35e-11 
       _cons |  -.0013661   .0324612    -0.04   0.966    -.0649889    .0622568 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass8      |   
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       drvc8 |  -7.01e-11   1.81e-10    -0.39   0.698    -4.24e-10    2.84e-10 
        ppe8 |  -4.15e-10   1.91e-10    -2.17   0.030∗     -7.90e-10   -4.08e-11 
       _cons |   .0392561   .0383987     1.02   0.307    -.0360039    .1145162 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass9      |   
       drvc9 |  -5.81e-11   1.48e-11    -3.94   0.000∗     -8.70e-11   -2.92e-11 
        ppe9 |   1.83e-11   1.68e-11     1.09   0.277    -1.47e-11    5.13e-11 
       _cons |  -.1044566   .0465743    -2.24   0.025∗     -.1957406   -.0131727 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass10     |   
      drvc10 |   1.34e-12   1.93e-12     0.69   0.488    -2.44e-12    5.11e-12 
       ppe10 |   4.58e-13   1.15e-12     0.40   0.689    -1.79e-12    2.70e-12 
       _cons |  -.1384495    .050067    -2.77   0.006∗     -.2365789     -.04032 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass11     |   
      drvc11 |   5.53e-11   3.91e-11     1.41   0.158    -2.14e-11    1.32e-10 
       ppe11 |   1.10e-11   8.91e-12     1.23   0.217    -6.46e-12    2.85e-11 
       _cons |  -.0494297    .016832    -2.94   0.003∗     -.0824198   -.0164396 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass12     |   
      drvc12 |  -3.98e-11   4.61e-12    -8.64   0.000∗     -4.89e-11   -3.08e-11 
       ppe12 |   4.41e-12   6.60e-12     0.67   0.504    -8.53e-12    1.73e-11 
       _cons |  -.0034275   .0104068    -0.33   0.742    -.0238245    .0169696 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass13     |   
      drvc13 |  -5.86e-11   1.46e-11    -4.01   0.000∗     -8.73e-11   -3.00e-11 
       ppe13 |   1.39e-10   1.16e-10     1.19   0.233    -8.93e-11    3.66e-10 
       _cons |  -.0386932   .0305228    -1.27   0.205    -.0985168    .0211303 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass14     |   
      drvc14 |   3.32e-11   3.01e-11     1.10   0.270    -2.58e-11    9.23e-11 
       ppe14 |   2.57e-10   1.21e-10     2.13   0.033∗      2.02e-11    4.95e-10 
       _cons |  -.0621031   .0237118    -2.62   0.009 ∗    -.1085773   -.0156289 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass15     |   
      drvc15 |  -9.56e-11   3.13e-11    -3.06   0.002∗     -1.57e-10   -3.43e-11 
       ppe15 |   5.87e-11   6.78e-11     0.86   0.387    -7.43e-11    1.92e-10 
       _cons |   .0516164   .0688714     0.75   0.454    -.0833691    .1866019 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass16     |   
      drvc16 |   3.34e-10   9.99e-11     3.35   0.001∗      1.39e-10    5.30e-10 
       ppe16 |   8.78e-12   7.24e-12     1.21   0.226    -5.42e-12    2.30e-11 
       _cons |   -.154124   .0190207    -8.10   0.000∗      -.191404   -.1168441 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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ta_ass17     |   
      drvc17 |  -2.06e-12   1.76e-12    -1.17   0.242    -5.50e-12    1.39e-12 
       ppe17 |   1.60e-11   3.33e-12     4.80   0.000∗      9.47e-12    2.25e-11 
       _cons |  -.0864767   .0200298    -4.32   0.000∗     -.1257344   -.0472189 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass18     |   
      drvc18 |   1.35e-09   1.35e-10     9.98   0.000∗      1.09e-09    1.62e-09 
       ppe18 |  -4.09e-09   3.01e-10   -13.59   0.000∗     -4.68e-09   -3.50e-09 
       _cons |   .8997046     .12552     7.17   0.000∗        .65369    1.145719 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass19     |   
      drvc19 |   2.66e-11   7.32e-12     3.63   0.000∗      1.23e-11    4.10e-11 
       ppe19 |   1.37e-10   1.95e-11     7.02   0.000∗      9.88e-11    1.75e-10 
       _cons |   -.290657   .0320422    -9.07   0.000∗     -.3534586   -.2278553 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass20     |   
      drvc20 |   1.38e-10   5.79e-11     2.38   0.017∗      2.43e-11    2.51e-10 
       ppe20 |  -4.31e-11   1.31e-11    -3.28   0.001∗     -6.89e-11   -1.74e-11 
       _cons |  -.0725718   .0201888    -3.59   0.000∗     -.1121412   -.0330024 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass21     |   
      drvc21 |   1.13e-11   2.71e-12     4.17   0.000∗      5.99e-12    1.66e-11 
       ppe21 |  -6.88e-12   9.77e-13    -7.04   0.000∗     -8.80e-12   -4.97e-12 
       _cons |  -.0108699    .009171    -1.19   0.236    -.0288448     .007105 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass22     |   
      drvc22 |  -3.56e-12   1.74e-12    -2.04   0.041∗    -6.98e-12   -1.41e-13 
       ppe22 |  -4.24e-13   2.07e-13    -2.05   0.040∗    -8.29e-13   -1.90e-14 
       _cons |  -.0242505   .0067481    -3.59   0.000∗     -.0374766   -.0110245 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass23     |   
      drvc23 |   1.94e-09   6.07e-10     3.20   0.001∗      7.52e-10    3.13e-09 
       ppe23 |  -5.02e-10   3.76e-10    -1.33   0.182    -1.24e-09    2.35e-10 
       _cons |   .2132432   .1181006     1.81   0.071    -.0182297     .444716 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass24     |   
      drvc24 |  -1.35e-11   2.86e-11    -0.47   0.636    -6.95e-11    4.25e-11 
       ppe24 |   1.52e-11   1.62e-11     0.94   0.348    -1.65e-11    4.69e-11 
       _cons |  -.0706308   .0298423    -2.37   0.018∗     -.1291207    -.012141 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass25     |   
      drvc25 |  -2.65e-11   5.64e-12    -4.70   0.000∗     -3.76e-11   -1.55e-11 
       ppe25 |  -1.62e-10   2.02e-11    -8.06   0.000∗     -2.02e-10   -1.23e-10 
       _cons |   .1329012   .0216608     6.14   0.000∗      .0904468    .1753556 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass26     |   
      drvc26 |   1.23e-10   2.13e-10     0.58   0.565    -2.94e-10    5.39e-10 
       ppe26 |  -1.42e-09   6.79e-10    -2.09   0.037∗    -2.75e-09   -8.62e-11 
       _cons |   .1482442   .1040364     1.42   0.154    -.0556634    .3521519 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass27     |   
      drvc27 |   4.64e-11   4.61e-12    10.06   0.000∗      3.74e-11    5.54e-11 
       ppe27 |  -2.04e-10   4.15e-11    -4.92   0.000∗     -2.85e-10   -1.23e-10 
       _cons |   .0296667   .0144416     2.05   0.040∗      .0013616    .0579718 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass28     |   
      drvc28 |  -2.97e-12   2.49e-12    -1.19   0.232    -7.85e-12    1.90e-12 
       ppe28 |   4.34e-15   5.65e-13     0.01   0.994    -1.10e-12    1.11e-12 
       _cons |  -.0485444   .0235076    -2.07   0.039∗     -.0946185   -.0024703 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass29     |   
      drvc29 |  -3.78e-11   9.03e-11    -0.42   0.676    -2.15e-10    1.39e-10 
       ppe29 |   3.60e-09   2.63e-09     1.37   0.172∗     -1.56e-09    8.76e-09 
       _cons |   -.110727   .0548668    -2.02   0.044∗      -.218264     -.00319 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass30     |   
      drvc30 |  -5.29e-10   2.37e-10    -2.23   0.026∗     -9.94e-10   -6.43e-11 
       ppe30 |   5.39e-11   1.84e-10     0.29   0.770    -3.07e-10    4.15e-10 
       _cons |  -.0121272   .1267638    -0.10   0.924    -.2605797    .2363252 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass31     |   
      drvc31 |   2.63e-11   2.55e-10     0.10   0.918    -4.73e-10    5.25e-10 
       ppe31 |   7.38e-10   7.05e-10     1.05   0.295    -6.44e-10    2.12e-09 
       _cons |  -.0666419   .0960837    -0.69   0.488    -.2549625    .1216788 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass32     |   
      drvc32 |   1.04e-11   5.34e-11     0.19   0.845    -9.43e-11    1.15e-10 
       ppe32 |  -8.82e-10   1.83e-09    -0.48   0.631    -4.47e-09    2.71e-09 
       _cons |   .3405817   .2954233     1.15   0.249    -.2384373    .9196006 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass33     |   
      drvc33 |  -3.35e-11   6.76e-11    -0.50   0.620    -1.66e-10    9.89e-11 
       ppe33 |  -2.92e-10   4.64e-11    -6.29   0.000∗     -3.83e-10   -2.01e-10 
       _cons |   .1248408   .0200487     6.23   0.000∗      .0855461    .1641355 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass34     |   
      drvc34 |  -5.89e-12   3.78e-12    -1.56   0.119    -1.33e-11    1.51e-12 
       ppe34 |  -6.34e-11   2.40e-11    -2.64   0.008∗     -1.10e-10   -1.63e-11 
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       _cons |   .0409097    .023824     1.72   0.086    -.0057844    .0876038 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass35     |   
      drvc35 |   8.03e-12   4.79e-11     0.17   0.867    -8.59e-11    1.02e-10 
       ppe35 |  -4.96e-11   2.40e-11    -2.07   0.038∗     -9.66e-11   -2.67e-12 
       _cons |   .0251117   .0504656     0.50   0.619    -.0737991    .1240226 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass36     |   
      drvc36 |  -5.66e-11   5.82e-11    -0.97   0.330    -1.71e-10    5.73e-11 
       ppe36 |   3.45e-12   8.24e-11     0.04   0.967    -1.58e-10    1.65e-10 
       _cons |   -.053489   .0333318    -1.60   0.109    -.1188182    .0118402 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass37     |   
      drvc37 |  -1.91e-10   1.46e-11   -13.12   0.000∗     -2.20e-10   -1.63e-10 
       ppe37 |   5.97e-11   9.18e-12     6.51   0.000∗      4.18e-11    7.77e-11 
       _cons |  -.0889051   .0260423    -3.41   0.001∗     -.1399471    -.037863 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass38     |   
      drvc38 |   4.88e-10   1.14e-10     4.29   0.000∗      2.65e-10    7.11e-10 
       ppe38 |  -3.81e-09   1.02e-09    -3.73   0.000∗     -5.81e-09   -1.80e-09 
       _cons |   .3760302   .1072663     3.51   0.000∗      .1657922    .5862683 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass39     |   
      drvc39 |   1.25e-11   1.22e-11     1.02   0.307    -1.15e-11    3.65e-11 
       ppe39 |  -2.84e-10   1.30e-10    -2.18   0.029∗     -5.38e-10   -2.91e-11 
       _cons |   .0453137   .0513761     0.88   0.378    -.0553816     .146009 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass40     |   
      drvc40 |   2.30e-11   8.15e-12     2.82   0.005∗      7.00e-12    3.90e-11 
       ppe40 |   5.00e-11   4.17e-11     1.20   0.231    -3.18e-11    1.32e-10 
       _cons |   -.069845   .0520025    -1.34   0.179     -.171768     .032078 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass41     |   
      drvc41 |  -2.69e-11   6.63e-12    -4.06   0.000∗     -3.99e-11   -1.39e-11 
       ppe41 |   2.84e-10   1.00e-10     2.83   0.005∗      8.74e-11    4.80e-10 
       _cons |  -.0812239   .0352004    -2.31   0.021∗     -.1502154   -.0122324 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass42     |   
      drvc42 |   3.61e-10   1.22e-10     2.94   0.003∗      1.21e-10    6.01e-10 
       ppe42 |   1.22e-09   2.55e-10     4.77   0.000∗      7.17e-10    1.72e-09 
       _cons |  -.6591321   .1701032    -3.87   0.000∗     -.9925282   -.3257359 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ta_ass43     |   
      drvc43 |   3.22e-11   1.59e-11     2.03   0.043∗      1.09e-12    6.33e-11 
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       ppe43 |   1.73e-10   1.05e-10     1.64   0.102    -3.41e-11    3.79e-10 
       _cons |  -.0558058   .0468788    -1.19   0.234    -.1476866     .036075 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass44     |   
      drvc44 |  -6.49e-12   3.59e-12    -1.81   0.071    -1.35e-11    5.45e-13 
       ppe44 |  -8.41e-13   3.16e-13    -2.66   0.008∗     -1.46e-12   -2.22e-13 
       _cons |  -.0204858   .0075568    -2.71   0.007∗     -.0352969   -.0056748 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass45     |   
      drvc45 |   9.05e-11   4.29e-11     2.11   0.035∗      6.36e-12    1.75e-10 
       ppe45 |  -9.73e-11   3.48e-11    -2.79   0.005∗     -1.66e-10   -2.91e-11 
       _cons |  -.0285481   .0569036    -0.50   0.616     -.140077    .0829809 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass46     |   
      drvc46 |  -5.58e-11   2.71e-11    -2.06   0.040∗     -1.09e-10   -2.61e-12 
       ppe46 |   5.95e-10   1.90e-10     3.13   0.002∗      2.22e-10    9.67e-10 
       _cons |  -.5070066   .1413666    -3.59   0.000∗       -.78408   -.2299332 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass47     |   
      drvc47 |   5.59e-13   4.15e-12     0.13   0.893    -7.57e-12    8.69e-12 
       ppe47 |  -1.37e-10   2.00e-11    -6.85   0.000∗     -1.76e-10   -9.77e-11 
       _cons |   .2060299   .0426392     4.83   0.000∗      .1224587    .2896011 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass48     |   
      drvc48 |  -7.32e-11   8.54e-11    -0.86   0.392    -2.41e-10    9.43e-11 
       ppe48 |  -6.61e-11   1.96e-11    -3.37   0.001∗    -1.05e-10   -2.76e-11 
       _cons |   -.014248   .0291266    -0.49   0.625    -.0713351     .042839 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass49     |   
      drvc49 |   3.09e-10   4.43e-10     0.70   0.485    -5.59e-10    1.18e-09 
       ppe49 |   9.09e-11   9.04e-11     1.01   0.314    -8.62e-11    2.68e-10 
       _cons |  -.1719255   .0697055    -2.47   0.014∗     -.3085458   -.0353051 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass50     |   
      drvc50 |   3.80e-11   8.49e-12     4.48   0.000∗      2.14e-11    5.47e-11 
       ppe50 |  -1.12e-10   1.75e-11    -6.38   0.000∗     -1.46e-10   -7.73e-11 
       _cons |   .2065082    .026752     7.72   0.000∗      .1540752    .2589412 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass51     |   
      drvc51 |   1.11e-11   1.18e-11     0.94   0.347    -1.21e-11    3.44e-11 
       ppe51 |  -2.03e-11   2.27e-11    -0.90   0.370    -6.48e-11    2.41e-11 
       _cons |   .0112812   .0184087     0.61   0.540    -.0247993    .0473617 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass52     |   
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      drvc52 |  -7.17e-12   1.19e-11    -0.60   0.547    -3.05e-11    1.62e-11 
       ppe52 |  -1.46e-12   2.55e-12    -0.57   0.568    -6.45e-12    3.54e-12 
       _cons |  -.0327783   .0158286    -2.07   0.038∗     -.0638017   -.0017548 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass53     |   
      drvc53 |  -1.31e-11   4.44e-12    -2.95   0.003∗     -2.18e-11   -4.40e-12 
       ppe53 |  -1.40e-11   2.45e-11    -0.57   0.569    -6.21e-11    3.41e-11 
       _cons |  -.0238284   .0325951    -0.73   0.465    -.0877136    .0400569 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass54     |   
      drvc54 |   3.61e-11   1.39e-11     2.60   0.009∗      8.87e-12    6.33e-11 
       ppe54 |  -1.06e-11   3.87e-12    -2.73   0.006∗     -1.82e-11   -2.99e-12 
       _cons |  -.0075291   .0261485    -0.29   0.773    -.0587792     .043721 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass55     |   
      drvc55 |  -1.82e-11   3.70e-12    -4.91   0.000∗     -2.55e-11   -1.09e-11 
       ppe55 |  -3.36e-12   5.19e-12    -0.65   0.518    -1.35e-11    6.81e-12 
       _cons |  -.0266841    .021486    -1.24   0.214    -.0687959    .0154276 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass56     |   
      drvc56 |   2.20e-11   2.49e-11     0.88   0.377    -2.68e-11    7.08e-11 
       ppe56 |   4.35e-12   9.19e-12     0.47   0.636    -1.37e-11    2.24e-11 
       _cons |   -.130153   .0298267    -4.36   0.000∗     -.1886122   -.0716938 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass57     |   
      drvc57 |  -7.16e-11   2.56e-11    -2.80   0.005∗     -1.22e-10   -2.15e-11 
       ppe57 |   1.74e-10   1.36e-10     1.28   0.200    -9.23e-11    4.40e-10 
       _cons |   .0025507   .0306288     0.08   0.934    -.0574806    .0625821 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass58     |   
      drvc58 |  -1.73e-10   1.77e-10    -0.98   0.327    -5.19e-10    1.73e-10 
       ppe58 |  -1.32e-10   4.35e-10    -0.30   0.762    -9.84e-10    7.20e-10 
       _cons |   .1563536   .0826766     1.89   0.059    -.0056895    .3183968 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass59     |   
      drvc59 |  -1.38e-11   2.99e-12    -4.62   0.000∗     -1.97e-11   -7.94e-12 
       ppe59 |   3.87e-12   1.45e-12     2.67   0.008∗      1.03e-12    6.71e-12 
       _cons |  -.0384191   .0110308    -3.48   0.000∗     -.0600391   -.0167991 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass60     |   
      drvc60 |   9.68e-10   1.86e-11    52.14   0.000∗      9.32e-10    1.00e-09 
       ppe60 |  -4.43e-10   2.72e-11   -16.29   0.000∗     -4.97e-10   -3.90e-10 
       _cons |   .0003235   .0099576     0.03   0.974    -.0191931    .0198402 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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ta_ass61     |   
      drvc61 |  -2.01e-11   6.94e-11    -0.29   0.772    -1.56e-10    1.16e-10 
       ppe61 |   1.06e-09   4.21e-10     2.51   0.012∗      2.31e-10    1.88e-09 
       _cons |  -.2076952   .0803694    -2.58   0.010∗     -.3652163   -.0501741 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass62     |   
      drvc62 |  -1.18e-10   4.62e-11    -2.56   0.010∗     -2.09e-10   -2.78e-11 
       ppe62 |  -5.63e-09   1.26e-09    -4.46   0.000∗     -8.10e-09   -3.16e-09 
       _cons |   .8149972   .2054915     3.97   0.000∗      .4122413    1.217753 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass63     |   
      drvc63 |  -1.79e-11   1.62e-11    -1.10   0.270    -4.96e-11    1.39e-11 
       ppe63 |   5.95e-12   2.53e-12     2.35   0.019∗      9.94e-13    1.09e-11 
       _cons |  -.0371568   .0094493    -3.93   0.000∗     -.0556771   -.0186364 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass64     |   
      drvc64 |   9.53e-11   4.59e-11     2.08   0.038∗      5.37e-12    1.85e-10 
       ppe64 |   7.13e-11   1.69e-10     0.42   0.674    -2.60e-10    4.03e-10 
       _cons |   .0761342   .1229281     0.62   0.536    -.1648004    .3170688 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass65     |   
      drvc65 |  -4.42e-11   9.33e-12    -4.74   0.000∗     -6.25e-11   -2.59e-11 
       ppe65 |  -1.20e-11   1.83e-11    -0.65   0.513    -4.77e-11    2.38e-11 
       _cons |   .0164943   .0138972     1.19   0.235    -.0107437    .0437322 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass66     |   
      drvc66 |  -3.15e-11   4.49e-12    -7.02   0.000∗     -4.03e-11   -2.27e-11 
       ppe66 |   3.94e-11   2.17e-11     1.82   0.069    -3.02e-12    8.19e-11 
       _cons |  -.0977301   .0316935    -3.08   0.002∗     -.1598483   -.0356119 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass67     |   
      drvc67 |  -1.86e-11   1.04e-10    -0.18   0.858    -2.22e-10    1.85e-10 
       ppe67 |   1.84e-10   1.18e-10     1.56   0.119    -4.73e-11    4.15e-10 
       _cons |  -.0568421   .0444605    -1.28   0.201    -.1439831    .0302989 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass68     |   
      drvc68 |   4.06e-12   4.65e-12     0.87   0.383    -5.05e-12    1.32e-11 
       ppe68 |  -2.32e-12   4.60e-12    -0.51   0.613    -1.13e-11    6.68e-12 
       _cons |  -.0201925   .0301654    -0.67   0.503    -.0793156    .0389305 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass69     |   
      drvc69 |  -2.04e-10   8.29e-11    -2.46   0.014∗     -3.67e-10   -4.17e-11 
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       ppe69 |  -2.31e-11   5.68e-11    -0.41   0.684    -1.34e-10    8.82e-11 
       _cons |   .0170265   .0660934     0.26   0.797    -.1125141    .1465672 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass70     |   
      drvc70 |  -2.79e-10   2.46e-11   -11.38   0.000∗     -3.27e-10   -2.31e-10 
       ppe70 |   9.33e-12   1.03e-11     0.91   0.365    -1.08e-11    2.95e-11 
       _cons |  -.1446435   .0286234    -5.05   0.000∗     -.2007444   -.0885426 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass71     |   
      drvc71 |  -6.02e-11   3.38e-11    -1.78   0.075    -1.26e-10    6.16e-12 
       ppe71 |   1.10e-11   3.90e-11     0.28   0.777    -6.54e-11    8.74e-11 
       _cons |   .0197131   .0609443     0.32   0.746    -.0997355    .1391617 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass72     |   
      drvc72 |  -8.06e-11   2.91e-11    -2.77   0.006∗     -1.38e-10   -2.36e-11 
       ppe72 |   1.28e-09   2.08e-10     6.12   0.000∗      8.68e-10    1.68e-09 
       _cons |  -.1912365   .0366899    -5.21   0.000∗     -.2631475   -.1193256 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass73     |   
      drvc73 |   3.63e-13   5.59e-12     0.07   0.948    -1.06e-11    1.13e-11 
       ppe73 |  -2.43e-11   5.00e-11    -0.49   0.626    -1.22e-10    7.36e-11 
       _cons |   .0328044   .0388904     0.84   0.399    -.0434194    .1090283 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass74     |   
      drvc74 |   1.11e-11   4.02e-11     0.28   0.783    -6.77e-11    8.98e-11 
       ppe74 |   2.80e-09   4.07e-09     0.69   0.492    -5.19e-09    1.08e-08 
       _cons |  -.0406249   .0852333    -0.48   0.634    -.2076791    .1264293 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass75     |   
      drvc75 |  -6.03e-12   7.41e-12    -0.81   0.416    -2.05e-11    8.49e-12 
       ppe75 |   1.99e-11   1.06e-11     1.88   0.060    -8.23e-13    4.06e-11 
       _cons |  -.1308635    .016892    -7.75   0.000∗     -.1639711   -.0977559 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass76     |   
      drvc76 |   4.04e-11   3.66e-11     1.10   0.270    -3.14e-11    1.12e-10 
       ppe76 |   3.35e-10   1.98e-10     1.70   0.090    -5.21e-11    7.23e-10 
       _cons |  -.2125689   .1782726    -1.19   0.233    -.5619767    .1368389 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass77     |   
      drvc77 |   1.10e-09   7.97e-10     1.39   0.166    -4.58e-10    2.67e-09 
       ppe77 |  -1.68e-10   2.68e-10    -0.63   0.531    -6.94e-10    3.58e-10 
       _cons |   .0190945   .2062184     0.09   0.926    -.3850862    .4232751 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass78     |   
      drvc78 |  -5.27e-11   1.92e-11    -2.74   0.006∗     -9.04e-11   -1.50e-11 
       ppe78 |  -1.08e-11   1.93e-11    -0.56   0.575    -4.85e-11    2.69e-11 
       _cons |  -.0235665   .0410603    -0.57   0.566    -.1040431    .0569102 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass79     |   
      drvc79 |   1.55e-11   1.62e-11     0.96   0.339    -1.63e-11    4.72e-11 
       ppe79 |   3.38e-12   8.48e-12     0.40   0.690    -1.32e-11    2.00e-11 
       _cons |  -.0763425   .0212206    -3.60   0.000∗     -.1179341   -.0347509 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass80     |   
      drvc80 |  -1.41e-10   8.49e-11    -1.66   0.097    -3.07e-10    2.57e-11 
       ppe80 |   3.97e-11   2.11e-10     0.19   0.851    -3.73e-10    4.53e-10 
       _cons |   .0326311   .0438974     0.74   0.457    -.0534061    .1186684 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass81     |   
      drvc81 |   2.80e-11   1.16e-11     2.42   0.016∗      5.29e-12    5.06e-11 
       ppe81 |  -8.78e-11   2.45e-11    -3.58   0.000∗    -1.36e-10   -3.97e-11 
       _cons |   .0582147   .0212178     2.74   0.006∗      .0166286    .0998008 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass82     |   
      drvc82 |   2.85e-13   7.85e-12     0.04   0.971    -1.51e-11    1.57e-11 
       ppe82 |  -1.51e-11   1.25e-11    -1.21   0.225    -3.96e-11    9.31e-12 
       _cons |  -.0819604   .0361964    -2.26   0.024∗     -.1529041   -.0110167 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass83     |   
      drvc83 |  -6.15e-11   3.31e-11    -1.86   0.063    -1.26e-10    3.45e-12 
       ppe83 |   5.31e-10   2.16e-10     2.45   0.014∗      1.07e-10    9.55e-10 
       _cons |   .0295481    .021993     1.34   0.179    -.0135574    .0726537 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass84     |   
      drvc84 |  -8.24e-11   2.87e-11    -2.87   0.004∗     -1.39e-10   -2.62e-11 
       ppe84 |   3.59e-11   3.72e-11     0.97   0.334    -3.70e-11    1.09e-10 
       _cons |  -.2105403   .2399234    -0.88   0.380    -.6807816     .259701 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass85     |   
      drvc85 |  -2.33e-12   8.62e-13    -2.71   0.007∗     -4.02e-12   -6.43e-13 
       ppe85 |  -5.20e-14   1.90e-13    -0.27   0.784    -4.24e-13    3.20e-13 
       _cons |  -.1170374   .0296303    -3.95   0.000∗     -.1751116   -.0589631 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass86     |   
      drvc86 |   1.53e-13   6.49e-15    23.64   0.000∗      1.41e-13    1.66e-13 
       ppe86 |   1.36e-13   2.39e-14     5.69   0.000∗      8.91e-14    1.83e-13 
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       _cons |  -.1553525   .0087388   -17.78   0.000∗    -.1724803   -.1382247 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass87     |   
      drvc87 |  -1.77e-10   1.30e-11   -13.67   0.000∗     -2.03e-10   -1.52e-10 
       ppe87 |  -1.18e-09   3.75e-10    -3.14   0.002∗     -1.91e-09   -4.41e-10 
       _cons |   .1565114   .0475592     3.29   0.001∗      .0632971    .2497256 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass88     |   
      drvc88 |  -3.60e-12   5.59e-13    -6.43   0.000∗     -4.69e-12   -2.50e-12 
       ppe88 |  -7.22e-12   2.65e-12    -2.73   0.006∗     -1.24e-11   -2.03e-12 
       _cons |   .0150788   .0081836     1.84   0.065    -.0009608    .0311184 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass89     |   
      drvc89 |   1.83e-11   7.68e-12     2.38   0.017∗      3.23e-12    3.33e-11 
       ppe89 |   4.44e-11   2.10e-11     2.12   0.034     3.36e-12    8.55e-11 
       _cons |  -.1408386   .0361284    -3.90   0.000∗     -.2116491   -.0700282 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass90     |   
      drvc90 |  -2.28e-10   1.30e-10    -1.75   0.079    -4.83e-10    2.67e-11 
       ppe90 |  -1.77e-09   1.50e-10   -11.82   0.000∗     -2.06e-09   -1.48e-09 
       _cons |   .7701569   .0727301    10.59   0.000∗      .6276085    .9127052 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass91     |   
      drvc91 |  -3.27e-11   9.74e-12    -3.35   0.001∗     -5.18e-11   -1.36e-11 
       ppe91 |  -3.08e-11   2.44e-11    -1.26   0.207    -7.85e-11    1.70e-11 
       _cons |  -.0032247   .0621543    -0.05   0.959    -.1250448    .1185955 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass92     |   
      drvc92 |   6.77e-10   5.36e-10     1.26   0.206    -3.73e-10    1.73e-09 
       ppe92 |   3.79e-10   2.84e-10     1.34   0.182    -1.77e-10    9.35e-10 
       _cons |  -.1145626   .0857328    -1.34   0.181    -.2825957    .0534706 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ta_ass93     |   
      drvc93 |   7.72e-12   2.49e-12     3.10   0.002∗      2.83e-12    1.26e-11 
       ppe93 |   9.87e-12   3.15e-12     3.13   0.002∗      3.69e-12    1.60e-11 
       _cons |  -.2034646   .0339645    -5.99   0.000∗     -.2700338   -.1368955 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
